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NOTES
Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative Distinction:
Semantical Feinting with an Exception to
Rulemaking Procedures
One of the major concerns of administrative law is the identifica-
tion of administrative action that requires prior notice and a public
hearing. Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act allows
exemption from such rulemaking procedures when the administrative
agency is promulgating an "interpretative" rule.1 While courts have
generally determined the applicability of this exemption by distinguish-
ing an action that is based on the administrator's interpretative power
from one that is based on his legislative power,2 this distinction may not
adequately protect the due process policies underlying the notice and
hearing requirement of administrative law.3 Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization v. Simon,4 in which a divided District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held a Revenue Ruling interpretative on the
basis of the legislative-interpretative distinction, reveals that the efficacy
of the distinction may depend upon the manner in which it is judicially
applied and explores an alternative judicial approach for which there is
growing support.5
In 1956 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling' 56-1851 which required
hospitals to "accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1970) provides:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published . . . . Mhis
subsection does not apply-(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or (B) when
.. notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest. (c) After notice required by this section, the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or with-
out opportunity for oral presentation.
2. See text accompanying notes 19-28 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 66-72 infra.
4. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
5. See text accompanying notes 35-40 infra.
6. " A 'Revenue Ruling' is an official interpretation by the Service issued only
by the National Office and published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin for the informa-
tion and guidance of taxpayers, service personnel and others concerned." Rogovin, The
Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 764 (1965).
See also Rev. Proc. 28, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 496, 497.
7. Rev. Rul. 185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202.
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suoh services" in order to qualify for a charitable exemption.' This
requirement was eliminated by the IRS in 1969 through Revenue Ruling
69-545. 9 A group of health and welfare organizations and indigent
persons in Eastern Kentucky persuaded a federal district court to invali-
date Revenue Ruling 69-545 and enjoin its enforcement by the IRS.10
The appellate court, however, disagreed and in a two-to-one decision
refused to invalidate the ruling."1
The court resolved the question of the need for rulemaking proce-
dures on the basis of the legislative-interpretative distinction. Revenue
Ruling 69-545 was held to be an interpretative rule, a statement of the
administrator's opinion as to -the meaning of a statute or regulation, and
not a legislative rule which creates law by implementing the statutory
powers of the agency12 and is subject to section 553 proceedings. A
government admission -that the ruling had no binding effect and that the
court was free to review its substantive validity supported the view that
the rule had no force of law. The contradiction of the old ruling by the
new was found to be of no consequence since there was an intervening
Treasury Regulation 13 that adopted a broader concept of "charitable."
The Treasury Regulation had been adopted pursuant to notice and a
public hearing, and Ruling 69-545 conformed the definition of "charita-
ble -hospital" to that regulation.' 4
After concluding that the interpretative nature of the rule preclud-
ed the necessity for section 553 procedures and therefore permitted a
8. Section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, describes organiza-
tions exempt from income tax under section 501 (a) as groups "organized and operated
exclusively for . . . charitable ... purposes." Sections 170(a) through 170(c) allow
individual and corporate donors to deduct from their income tax contributions to
501 (c) (3) organizations.
9. Rev. Rul. 545, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 117.
10. 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.). The district court held that the
ruling was invalid in that it was contrary to the legislative intent. The due process issues
of section 553 were not reached. Id. at 338.
11. 506 F.2d 1278. Plaintiff appellees' challenge to the rule on the basis of the
Administrative Procedure Act was an issue before the dourt only after resolution of the
government's challenges. The district court was upheld in rejecting claims of no
jurisdiction on the bases of sovereign immunity, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 1282-86. The court of appeals, however, reversed
the decision below on the grounds that the Revenue Ruling was consistent with
congressional decisions. Id. at 1286-90.
12. But cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805.
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (d) (2) (1959).
14. 506 F.2d at 1290. Judge Wright, however, excepted to the majority basis for
calling the ruling interpretative. Since this ruling effects a "substantial change in the
availability of hospital services to the poor" and the IRS is not an "expert in health care
delivery needs," he determined that the purpose of section 553 called for notice and
hearing so that interested and affected parties could educate the agency. Id. at 1291-92.
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judicial judgment as to its propriety, 15 the court refused to hear evidence
from the parties in making that judgment. They reasoned that Ruling
69-545 contained two specific requirements substantially benefitting the
poor 6 and was consistent with the Treasury Regulation, and that the
changed status of health care in the country justified a new definition.'
These judicial facts satisfied a finding of no abuse of discretion in the
agency's determination.'"
The legal framework within which Eastern Kentucky' was decided
is provided by federal statute and cases decided thereunder. Section
553 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and
hearing by an agency promulgating a rule that does not satisfy one of
the statutory exceptions. 19 Interpretative rules, one of these exceptions,
have been defined as statements of the administrative officer as to what
he thinks a statute means, and are distinguished from non-interpretative
or legislative rules which are based on a congressional delegation of
power to make regulations legislative in character.2"
Legislative rules derive a status of the force of law from their
authority, while interpretative rules are not binding on the courts.2 '
The force of law status limits the review of legislative rules to questions
of statutory authority, reasonableness, and procedure of adoption.22 By
holding the required hearings for these rules, the administrative agency
carries out the policy-making functions, and, because the function is
legislatively delegated, the courts are reluctant to interfere.23 Interpre-
tative rules, however, are viewed as nonauthoritative and the court is
free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the
regulation. It has been held that the factors the court will consider in
making this judgment are: (1) the thoroughness of the rule's considera-
15. Id. at 1290.
16. See generally note 54 infra.
17. The court reasoned that Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs
have "greatly reduced the number of poor people requiring free or below cost hospital
services." Thus the rationale supporting Ruling 56-185 had disappeared. 506 F.2d at
1288-89.
18. Id. at 1291.
19. See note I supra.
20. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1964); United States
v. 353 Cases, 247 F.2d 473, 480 (8th Cir. 1957); Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d
329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952); O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Ohio
1968).
21. American President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 316 F.2d 419,
421 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03, at 298-99
(1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvis].
22. DAVIS, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 299.
23. Id. § 5.05, at 315.
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tion, (2) the validity of its reasoning, (3) its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and (4) all factors giving it power to per-
suade.24 These factors have not, however, been consistently applied.
Some cases have held that interpretative rules are subject to little judicial
scrutiny,25 while others have held that the reasonableness of the admin-
istrator's interpretation is to be tested closely. 20 Tax administrative
rules have not escaped these variations. Although Revenue Rulings are
generally held to be neither binding nor controlling as precedents,27
courts have also said that the "administrative interpretations of the IRS
• ..should be followed unless clearly inconsistent with the statute. '28
This inconsistency as to the authoritativeness of interpretative rules
probably results from -the variety and relative persuasiveness of factors
considered in judicial review of administrative rulemaking. 2  The ex-
pertise of the agency is one such factor. In highly technical areas the
agency's expert judgment will give the ruling a presumed validity or
decisive weight.30 Agency expertise has satisfied this standard in the
tax area,3' but judicial knowledge of tax law and policy will fre-
quently override this expertise. 2
24. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
25. Interpretative regulations have been held to have "the force and effect of law if
not contrary to statute." Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920).
They should "not be disturbed except for weighty reasons." Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S.
327, 336 (1930).
26. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791-92 (1968); FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 88
(5th Cir. 1974).
27. Aschaffenburg v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 510, 513 (E.D. La. 1974).
28. Cf. Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1961). This
case actually dealt with a Treasury Regulation. To understand the differences in
Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings see generally Rogovin, supra note 6. Admin-
istrative Rulings of the Treasury Department, which are consistent with the' statute and
have been consistently unchallenged, should not be overturned "except for very cogent
reasons." Farmers Cooperative Co. v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 229 (N.D. Iowa
1949).
29. One commentator has expressed the opinion that of these factors, the most
important may be judicial agreement or disagreement with the rule. DAVIS, supra note
21, § 5.05, at 317.
30. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968); Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Kern v. Granquist, 291
F.2d 29, 31-32 (9th Cir. 1961). Although the court in Kern recognized a logical and
more equitable interpretation of the statute, the majority chose to defer to the weight of
the Treasury Regulation.
32. United States v. Eddy Bros., 291 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1961) (the Revenue
Ruling was held contrary to statute); Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir.
1961) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410-11 (5th Cir.
1951).
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Another factor used in determining the validity of the interpretative
rule is the implied congressional sanction of the rule through reenact-
ment of the statute under which the rule is promulgated. The sanction
is based on assumed legislative knowledge of how the agency is applying
that law.3" This incorporation of the rule into law does not, however,
apply against the agency. So that Congress will not have to change the
statute every time there is a correction to be made in interpretation, the
administrative agency must be allowed to ohange a rule through its
rulemaking powers regardless of congressional reenactment.3 4
In the midst of this body of law dealing with the manner of review
of administrative rulings, there has developed a new method of deter-
mining whether or not a rule is subject to section 5:53 procedure.
Originating in the context of rulings alleged to be exempt as procedural,
this method was designed to satisfy the section 553 objectives of expos-
ing "proposed agency action. . . to the test of prior examination and
comment by the affected parties."35 Under this new approach the basis
for exemption from rulemaking proceedings is not the facile semantic
distinctions of the definitions of "procedural" and "interpretative," but
is instead the rule's importance to those regulated and to the public. To
determine if a rule is sufficiently important (has a substantial effect),
there are four considerations: (1) the complexity and pervasiveness of
the rules issued, (2) the degree of departure from former practices
resulting from the rule (termed by courts as "drastic changes affected"),
(3) the degree of retroactivity of the rule, and (4) the confusion and
controversy engendered by practical difficulties of compliance with the
new rule.3" This analysis does not look -to what the agency says it is
33. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 510 (1959); Commissioner v.
Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 469 (1946). On the other hand it has been said that this is a
fiction if the point sanctioned never occurred to Congress in the reenactment. Western
Union v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 508 (1945). Validity of Treasury Rulings through
reenactment has been considered a nullity as the statutes are no longer periodically
renewed. L. WRIGHT, COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAXATION
65 (1968); Popkin, A Critique of the Rule-Making Process in Federal Income Tax Law
with Special Reference to Conglomerate Acquisitions, 45 IND. L.J. 453, 511 (1970).
34. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp. v. United States, 303 F.2d 928, 934 (Ct. Cl.
1962).
35. National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96
(D.D.C. 1967) (Burger, C.J., then a circuit judge, joined in an opinion by McGowan,
J.), affd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968). See also Pharmaceuticals Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). In dealing with an FDA regulation, the court said
that the policy of section 553 mandated the availability of prior comment if the rule "has
a substantial impact on... the members or the products of that industry .... "Id. at
863.
36. American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of :Fed. Reserve Sys.,
1976] 425
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doing, but instead examines the actual effect of the rule. A "substantial
effect" on rights and obligations necessitating rulemaking procedures
has been found in regulations that nullified a student exemption from a
labor certificate required for immigrant status,37 established new
qualifications for parole,38 established an evidentiary standard that may
have stopped the marketing of thousands of drugs,3 9 and allowed air-
lines to use X-rays to guard against hijacking and thus created a health
risk for airlines' employees and travellers. 40 Although prior notice and
hearing was essential in the adoption of these rules, such procedures are
unnecessary if the due process standards are satisfied in another pro-
ceeding. American Bancorporation, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System41 illustrates two possible manners in which
another proceeding may substitute.
At issue in American Banco was a rule promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board to substantially expand permissible banking activities.
Although it had serious public and business implications and was issued
without prior notice and hearing, an attempt to invalidate the rule failed.
The rule was a narrower version of another rule that had been recently
adopted after notice and hearing; at that hearing the agency -had heard
discussion of the banking activities permitted by the new rule. 2 A
second basis for allowing the exclusion of section 553 proceedings was
found in the passive status of the rule. Before a bank could enter the
activities allowed by the rule, it had to obtain Federal Reserve Board
approval preceded by a hearing with public participation.4" Despite the
absence of rulemaking procedures the agency was educated before the
rule became effective.44 Participation at some stage by those affected is
clearly critical. If affected parties cannot participate, there is serious
danger that the administrative agency will view the rule in light of its
509 F.2d 29, 33 (8th Cir. 1974); Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197
(D. Del. 1970).
37. Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
38. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
39. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
40. Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).
41. 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974).
42. This first hearing was held one year before the latter rule was adopted. The
hearing considered allowing bank holding companies to participate in multiple activities.
The former rule adopted a general policy statement which was limited by the contested
rule to five specific activities. Id. at 33-34.
43. The fact that a later hearing may be had does not, however, protect parties
where an administrative ruling creates legal consequences in advance of hearings. See
CBS v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417-20 (1942).
44. 509 F.2d at 35.
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narrow purpose and ignore the broader implications of the action. 45
Such implications were admittedly ignored by the IRS in promulgating
the rule that was the subject of litigation in Gibson Wine Co. v.
Snyder."
Pursuant to the Federal Alcohol Administrative Act -the IRS issued
a ruling requiring that wine made from the boysenberry variety of
blackberry be labelled as boysenberry wine. Challenged in Gibson
Wine, the rule was found to be exempt from notice and hearing require-
ments. In basing its holding on the legislative-interpretative distinction,
the court noted that although it was necessary to inform the consumer,
this rule could be working an injustice. The boysenberry was only one
of several varieties of blackberry, all of which had a different flavor. By
creating a name foreign to the consumer, this rule would cause the
producers of boysenberry wine to maintain a more than modest expense
to develop a new market. To satisfy the consumer and protect the
business interests, the court, after hearing from all parties to the dispute,
recommended a possible judicious alternative label of "Blackberry Wine
of the Boysenberry Variety. 47  Subsequent IRS adoption of the judi-
cially proposed alternative indicates that better administrative action
results from participation by affected parties. 4"
If regulations merely adopting a definition of "a type of grape '' 49
could be found to create inequities justifying modification, a de novo
hearing in Eastern Kentucky may have 'similarly produced influential
evidence. 50  Holding that Revenue Ruling 69-545 was interpretative
and not subject to rulemaking procedures, the majority in Eastern
Kentucky noted that the ruling -had "no independent binding effect and
that the courts . .. [may or may not] choose to accept it as proper."51
Although the majority recognized that they were free to insert their
judgment as to the wisdom of the rule before accepting its reasoning, the
dissent claimed that there was not a proper hearing to determine the
45. See generally text accompanying and cases cited notes 35-39 supra.
46. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
47. Id. at 336. The consumer would know the fruit of his wine, and the
boysenberry wine producers do not bear an additional expense for the promotion of their
product.
48. See Note, Power of Administrative Agencies to Change Interpretative Rules, 1
J. PUB. LAw 491, 497 (1952).
49. This was the phrase used by Judge Bazelon in distinguishing rules held
interpretative from Revenue Ruling 69-545. Ironically he found definitions of "a type of
grape" in Gibson Wine to be justifiably interpretative on the basis of its insignificance.
506 F.2d at 1292 n.1 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 1292-93.
51. Id. at 1290.
1976] 427
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ruling's merits.52 The court considered all the elements suggested to be
used in reviewing a nonauthoritative ruling with the possible exception
of "all factors giving (the rule) power to persuade."5 3  While the
dismissal of the alleged lack of consideration of the needs of the poor
was based on the elements of Ruling 69-545 assumed to benefit the
poor,54 use of these superficial assumptions as representative of "all
persuading factors" omits consideration of authorities and data that
might prove these assumptions incorrect.5 5 The IRS in Eastern Ken-
tucky, as in Gibson Wine, had issued the ruling in the shelter of their
bureaucracy. Unlike Gibson Wine, however, the lack of participation
by the affected parties at the administrative level was not corrected at
the judicial level. Although the alleged injustice to the indigent may
not exist or may conflict with more important aims of the Revenue
Ruling, these issues are indeterminable until the scope of the alleged
adverse effect is defined.
The conclusion that affected parties should be heard does not
necessarily negate the possibility that due process considerations were
not satisfied at a prior proceeding. In holding the ruling to be interpre-
tative, the majority in Eastern Kentucky found support in Treasury
Regulations adopted in 1959 after notice and hearing. Ten years after
adoption of the regulations, Ruling 69-545 conformed the definition of
"charitable hospital" to the concept of "charitable" adopted by the
earlier Regulation.56 Although a public hearing for a prior rule was
justification for holding a rule to be interpretative in American Banco,
the previous hearing had included consideration of the activities accept-
ed three years later in the contested rule.57 The hearings for the 1959
52. Id. at 1292-93.
53. See generally text accompanying note 24 supra. The court examined the rule's
consideration, its reasoning, and its consistency with other pronouncements in upholding
the legislative validity. 506 F.2d at 1286-90.
54. This assumption was based on the fact that the Revenue Ruling had allowed
exemption for a hospital which gave emergency service for indigents and accepted
patients with third party payment plans. The court further felt that "Ruling 69-545 may
be of greater benefit to the poor than its predecessor Ruling 56-185." 506 F.2d at 1289.
Part of this belief that the rule benefitted the poor was based on the majority's opinion
that Ruling 56-185 permitted a hospital operating at a deficit to qualify for charitable
exemption with no obligations to the poor. Id. at 1289 n.26. However, this selective
quote by the court omits the qualification that the hospital "must not, however, refuse to
accept patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for such services." Rev. Rul.
185, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 202,203.
55. Cf. Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8
HAgv. Civ. Rirn-s-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 351 (1973).
56. 506 F.2d at 1290.
57. 509 F.2d at 33-34. The former ruling had authorized a broad scope of banking
activities, and in making the new ruling, the Board had narrowed the former ruling to
[Vol. 54
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Treasury Regulation in Eastern Kentucky apparently did not weigh the
implications of "charitable" as applied to hospitals.5 8 This fact in
combination with the time span between the hearings and adoption of
the Revenue Ruling indicate that it was not truly subject to examination
by affected parties.59
The conclusion that a conflict may be competently resolved only
after a hearing does not, however, lead automatically to the further
conclusion that the hearing should have been in the administrative body,
as the dissenters claim,6 0 rather than in the courts.6 ' The finding that
the ruling was interpretative, which allows public input to occur in the
courts, is supported by strong precedent. By using the origin of the
agency's rulemaking power to determine the rule's authoritative status
(and thus the necessity for hearings prior to promulgation), Revenue
Rulings are clearly interpretative.62 But even if the applicability of
rulemaking procedure was determined by the substantial effect test,63
the Revenue Ruling might be interpretative. The question would be
whether the rule has a substantial effect through the new rights and
obligations it creates. Of the considerations suggested for this determi-
nation, only the drastic changes affected are at issue.64 In support of
the majority it can be argued that the ruling will not actually cause
indigents to be turned away from hospitals in great numbers, and the
reverse presumption supports the dissent of Judge Wright. The fact
that the new ruling merely clarified the Treasury Regulation implies a
allow only five explicit activities. Under either rule the activities in question were
permissible.
58. 506 F.2d at 1286-90.
59. Compare the effect of Revenue Ruling 69-545 on Revenue Ruling 56-185, notes
7, 9 supra, with the effect of the amended regulation in American Banco, note 57 supra.
60. 501 F.2d at 1291-93.
61. Submissions by interested parties on all rules promulgated by an administrative
agency might be justified on the basis of the relatively efficient procedures of the
administrative body in comparison to those of the courts. In the interest of due process
considerations, such submissions have been proposed in the issuance of Revenue Rulings.
Where the submissions justify modifications there would be elimination of otherwise
needed judicial review. Where the IRS feels suggested modifications inappropriate,
judicial review should be discouraged by the likelihood of failure of a second challenge
on the basis of the same contention. See generally L. WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 67-68 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Macey's Jewelry Corp. v. United States, 387 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir.
1967). But cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805; DAvis, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
63. 506F.2dat1291.
64. See text accompanying note 36 supra. The other considerations may be
summarily dismissed. The rules are on their face not complex and generally have no
retroactive effect. See note 70 infra. Compliance with the ruling would not involve any
difficulties as it increases eligibility for charitable exemptions and adds no new require-
ments.
1976] 429
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
less drastic change. 65 On the other hand the revocation of the old
ruling and the long-standing administrative precedent seems severe.
While the action of the administrative agency in Eastern Kentucky
was arguably justifiable, the negative aspects of the legislative-interpre-
tative distinction have been illuminated above. 66 Although the primary
purpose of section 553 is the provision of an opportunity for affected
parties to voice concerns, thus contributing to the education of the
agency promulgating rules of significant consequence,6 7 courts generally
ignore this purpose and instead base the distinction on the existence of
statutory authority.68 This nearly exclusive emphasis upon the exist-
ence of statutory authority frequently leads to judicial failure to examine
the irreversible impact exerted by the rule before judicial review. For
example, Revenue Rulings, which are generally found to have no ex-
press statutory authority, 69 are given prospective effect by the IRS. Until
the ruling is judicially, administratively, or legislatively reversed, this
prospedtive effect guarantees IRS agents and taxpayers that meeting the
standard set by the rule is sufficient.70 Although courts are allowed to
treat the rulings as nonbinding, IRS policy has -had a permanent impact
in the intermediate period. Basing exemptions on statutory authority
has the additional problem of judicial confusion. Examination of the
cases illustrates ambiguities in both the understanding of what consti-
tutes statutory authority71 and the type of review warranted. 72  When
the issues examined by the court fail to focus on the purposes of the act,
the natural result is confusion.
The substantial effect rule apparently concentrates on the underly-
ing policy of section 553. All of the factors to be considered look to the
application of the rule; the need for notice and hearing is based on the
importance of that application. The question is "Does the rule have a
substantial impact?" Although there is the danger of semantical feint-
65. But cf. text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
67. See cases cited notes 35-40 supra.
68. See cases cited notes 20-21 supra.
69. See DAvIs, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
70. "Taxpayers generally may rely upon Revenue Rulings . . . in determining the
tax treatment of their own transactions . . . ." Rev. Proc. 1, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 386.
Although there is a power to revoke a Revenue Ruling retroactively, the Commissioner
has limited this power to allow the taxpayer to rely on the Commissioner's position
represented by the ruling. Rogovin, supra note 6, at 768-69. By encouraging modifica-
tion of taxpayer behavior to follow the Revenue Ruling, the agency has created an
impact on those parties affected by the modified behavior.
71. See DAvis, supra note 21, § 5.03, at 300.
72. See cases cited notes 25-28 supra.
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ing with this phrase,73 the courts seem impressed that they are weighing
the factors to determine the need for prior notice and hearing. 74 If
public participation is allowed in another proceeding, due process stan-
dards may be satisfied. If not, the factors weighed attempt to illuminate
the significance of the administrative action. 75  Although there will be
disagreements over the delineation of appropriate factors and the deter-
mination of their relative influence, the purpose of section 553 is more
likley to be realized by "substantial effect" analysis than by the legisla-
tive-interpretative distinction applied in Eastern Kentucky.
WILLIAM D. DANNELLY
Constitutional Law-Mortmain Statutes-A Blow to an Old
and Ailing Statute
Mortmain statutes,' which restrict2 charitable bequests in wills3
executed within a specified period4 before the testator's death, were
incorporated from the Georgian Statute of Mortmain5 into the constitu-
73. "Substantial impact," like "interpretative rule," could be analyzed in terms of its
meaning rather than its underlying purpose of ferreting out the need for notice and
hearing prior to the rule's promulgation.
74. See cases cited notes 35-41 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 36 supra. While the coordination of these con-
siderations is complex, each illuminates a factor of importance. A complex and per-
vasive rule indicates a greater likelihood of agency error that might be discovered
through public participation. Drastic changes, retroactivity, and difficulty in com-
pliance with the rule all indicate that there are persons with a direct interest in the rule.
That there are those injured is probably indicative of the rule's importance.
1. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) states, in
relevant part: "Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a
will or codicil executed within 30 days of the death of the testator shall be invalid to the
extent that someone who would benefit by its invalidity objects: Provided, That the
Commonwealth shall not have the right so to object .. "
2. Some statutes only limit the bequest, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (Supp. 1972)
allows an unlimited bequest to charity provided the first $100,000 of the testators estate
goes to his lineal descendants.
3. Pennsylvania, for example, invalidates certain inter vivos transfers to charitable
organizations made within thirty days of death. Joslin, Legal Restrictions on Gifts to
Charities, 21 TENN. L. REV. 761,764 & n.19 (1951).
4. The prohibited period ranges from thirty days to one year before death. 1 W.
BoWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 3.16 (1960).
5. Also called the Charitable Uses Act. For a discussion of the history see W.
ROLLISON, VILLS §§ 168-70 (1970); Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5
REAL PROPERTY, PROBAT & TRUST J. 290, 291 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Restrictions].
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tion and statutes of eleven American jurisdictions.7 These statutes
withstood challenges8 to their validity until 1972 when a district court in
In re Small9 found the District of Columbia statute to be a denial of
freedom of religion. 10 In 1974 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, iri In
re Estate of Cavill," became the first state supreme court to declare a
mortmain statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
Twenty-four days before her death, 3 Leona Cavill executed a will
containing a charitable bequest.14  The orphan's court5 -held the be-
quest effective and concluded that section 7(1) of the Wills Act,"0
which would have invalidated the bequest, violated the due process,
privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' 7  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed,' 8 but invalidated the mortmain statute solely
on equal protection grounds. The dissent 9 supported the validity of
6. Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 270.
7. CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 40-43 (West 1956); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (1935); IDAHO CODE § 15-
2-615 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.266 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-31
(1972); MONT. RED. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-3.3
(McKinney 1967); Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (Page 1954); and PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
8. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666
(1944); Decker v. American Univ., 236 Iowa 895, 20 N.W.2d 466 (1945); In re
Kruger's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 664, 257 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1965); Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio
St. 590 (1883).
9. Administration No. 2507-70 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972).
10. Id. at 3.
11. - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The "holding is likewise mandated by the
prohibition of special laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const. art. 111, § 32,
P.S." 329 A.2d at 505 n.7.
13. The prohibited period in Pennsylvania is thirty days before death. See note I
supra.
14. The residue of decedent's estate was to be divided among The American Heart
Association, The American Cancer Society Incorporated, The American Foundation for
the Blind, Boys Town of Boys Town, Nebraska and Zem Zem Hospital for Crippled
Children of Erie, Pa. 329 A.2d at 504 n.2.
15. Cavill Estate (Pa. O.C. 1973), discussed in, 56 ERiu COUN'rY LEGAL J. 44
(1974).
16. Act of April 14, 1947, § 7(1) [1947] Pa. Laws 89. The court also invalidated
the amended version of the mortmain statute. "[Testatrix died while the 1947 Act was
in effect .... Since section 7(1) and section 2507(1) are identical in effect, [the
court's] analysis of section 7(1) is equally applicable to section 2507(1)." 329 A.2d at
504 n.1.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
18. 329 A.2d 503.
19. Id. at 506.
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the statute20 against both equal protection and due process attacks.
Traditional equal protection analysis recognizes the right of a state
to erect necessary statutory classifications, 21 within certain limitations.
The state must prove a "compelling state interest ' 22 if the personal right
contravened by the classification is "fundamental, ' 2 3 suoh as the right to
vote,24 travel, ' ' procreate,20 work,27 or the freedom of religion28 or
association. 29  This rigid "strict scrutiny test ' 10 also adheres if the
classification is "suspect,"'" such as one based on race,3 2 national ori-
gin,33 or alienage. 4 But if neither fundamental rights nor suspect
classifications are involved, the constitutionality of the statutory classifi-
cation must be evaluated under the "rational basis test."35 The laxity36
of that test is indicated by the famous formulation in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.: 7
[Tihe existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis.38
The rational basis test has been applied to the regulation of com-
20. The dissent would limit invalidation to the 1947 version "[blecause the
language of the two provisions is not identical ....... Id. at 506 n.1.
21. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 344 (1949).
22. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
27. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
28. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
29. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
30. The test is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
31. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 1065, 1101
(1969).
32. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
33. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
34. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
35. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1073 (1974).
36. From 1937 to 1972, only one law was invalidated using the rational basis test.
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights:
Another A pproach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 811 (1973).
37. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
38. Id. at 152.
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mercial activity,3 9 social benefits,40 and taxation.41 The United States
Supreme Court has even applied the rational basis test in the area of
decedents' estates. In Labine v. Vincent42 the Supreme Court upheld
the Louisiana intestate succession law which excluded illegitimate chil-
dren from inheriting equally with legitimate children of an intestate
natural father.43
Prior equal protection challenges to the constitutionality of mort-
main statutes have traditionally invoked the rational basis test. In
Taylor v. Payne44 the Florida Supreme Court determined that that
state's mortmain statute did not deny the testator equal protection
because the state had the right to control the "testamentary alienation of
property. '45  The court found the purpose of the statute to be legiti-
mate: "to protect the widow and children from improvident gifts made
to their neglect by the testator. ' 46 A year later, in Decker v. American
University,47 the Iowa Supreme Court found that state's mortmain stat-
ute constitutional because it was "enacted to correct the evil of making
bequests for charitable purposes to the detriment of those who should be
the object of the testator's bounty." 48
In the face of these decisions, the court in Cavill relied upon an
unsophisticated version of the rational basis test" and found the mort-
main statute irrationally under-inclusive as well as over-inclusive.10 The
majority characterized the classification as a specious, temporal one that
gave effect to or voided a testator's bequest according to the accident of
the lapse of time5' between the execution of a will and the death of the
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
40. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972).
41. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
42. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
43. Id. at 538-39.
44. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
45. Id. at 362-63, 17 So. 2d at 617.
46. Id. at 364, 17 So. 2d at 618.
47. 236 Iowa 895,20 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
48. Id. at 902, 20 N.W.2d at 469.
49. 329 A.2d at 506. There is no possibility of applying the strict scrutiny test as
there is no fundamental right or suspect classification involved in Cavill. There has been
scholarly opinion to the effect that there is an emerging standard of review, a "newer
equal protection" being applied by the Court under the guise of the rational basis test.
The Court appears to be employing an intermediate standard of review in some cases
when the strict scrutiny test is unavailable and when the minimal scrutiny of the rational
basis test is ineffectual, supra note 35. E.g., Gunther, supra note 30. But the Supreme
Court has never actually said that an intermediate standard exists, so it cannot be relied
upon.
50. 329 A.2d at 506; see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 21, at 347-53.
51. 329 A.2d at 505-06.
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testator. 5 2  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the State's
argument that the classification was rationally related to the legislative
purpose of proscribing undue influence by charitable or religious orga-
nizations to the detriment of dependent heirs. 3
The dissent in Cavill argued that the rational basis test does not
require a "statute drawn with mathematical precision"54 as long as that
classification has a rational basis to a permissible state interest. How-
ever, if the state interest is protection of heirs who rely upon the testator
for support and who are the natural objects of his bounty, a classifica-
tion scheme that allows distant, even unknown legal heirs to challenge a
charitable bequest is only questionably related.55 If the state interest is,
on the other hand, protection of the testator from undue influence by
charitable or religious organizations, the rights of those charities become
the focus; theoretically, this is not a question of denial of equal protec-
tion but a violation of due process, and the standard of review changes
dramatically."'
By finding the classification arbitrary, the court in Cavill avoids
hypothesizing a statutory purpose and ruling on its permissibility. In
contrast, the focus in Taylor v. Payne and Decker v. American Universi-
ty was the permissibility of the objective, a focus that assumed the non-
capriciousness of the classification.
Mortmain statutes were originally enacted in England to prevent
ecclesiastical control of land in which the feudal overlords had an
interest. The statutes appeared in two forms: 57 the true "mortmain"
statutes',8 based on Magna Carta provisions that prohibited the holding
of real estate by charities;, 9 and the statutes now commonly called
"mortmain" based upon the Georgian Statute of Mortmain, which
52. Id. at 505.
53. Id. at 506.
54. Id. at 509, based on the criteria set out in Lindsley v. Natural Carbohic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
55. 329 A.2d at 506. In Cavill, the complaining heirs are nieces and nephews of
the decedent.
56. This alternative legislative purpose is postulated in In re Gredler's Estate, 361
Pa. 384, 389, 65 A.2d 404, 407 (1949). "[A] discussion of whether an irrebuttable
presumption rationally relates to a legislative end is confusing and unnecessary." Note,
Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to
LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173, 1198 (1974).
57. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 290.
58. Id. The term "mortmain" should not technically be applied to statutes which
restrict the donor from making charitable bequests. See In re Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal.
680, 115 P. 242 (1911); A. ScoTr, 5 TRusTs § 589(3)(c), at 3885 (1967).
59. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 290.
60. The Georgian Statute of Mortmain is also known as the Charitable Uses Act.
W. RoLLsoN, supra note 5, § 168.
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restricted the power to devise property to charity. The two forms
focused on the rights of different parties; the former limited the rights of
the donee-charity and the latter restricted the donor-testator. The
statutes were also designed to benefit different parties. The Magna
Carta provisions empowered only overlords or the crown to set aside the
transfer, whereas the Georgian Statute of Mortmain gave descendants of
the testator that right.6 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cavill0 2 focused its equal
protection analysis on the donor-testator.63 This choice of focus helps
distinguish the case from Labine v. Vincent 4 which the dissent consid-
ered crucial. 65 The statute reviewed in Cavill is historically related to
the Georgian Statute of Mortmain:16 both the English and the Pennsyl-
vania statutes center on the rights of the donor and the benefit to the
legal heirs.
The intestate succession statute in Labine, however, is functionally
similar to the older mortmain statute based on provisions in the Magna
Carta. The Magna Carta mortmain statute permitted the crown or an
overlord to prevent a charity from receiving a bequest; the property
bequeathed redounded to the state upon exercise of this power 1 The
Louisiana intestate law was intended to further a social organization that
relies upon the nuclear family and to establish an orderly intestate
succession system that would duplicate the probable property distribu-
tion of the decedent.0 8  The rights of the potential donee, the illegiti-
mate in Labine, are subjugated to the state's interest in a particular
social fabric, as the charities' rights bowed to the interests of the crown
under the Magna Carta provisions. In contrast, the rights of the donor-
testator under a mortmain statute should bow only to the testator's
obligation to his dependent heirs, as under the Georgian Statute of
Mortmain.
61. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 296.
62. 329 A.2d 503.
63. There is obviously some confusion by the court on this point. The court
"conclude[s] that section 7(1) denies the charitable beneficiaries equal protection of the
laws." Id. at 505 (footnote omitted). Yet the analysis clearly evaluates the classification
of testators.
64. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
65. 329 A.2d at 508.
66. Remick, Restrictions on Gilts for Religious or Charitable Uses, 51 Dicm. L,
REv. 201,202 (1947).
67. The Pennsylvania statute limits invalidation of the bequest "to the extent that
someone who would benefit by its invalidity objects: Provided, That the Commonwealth
shall not have the right so to object .... "PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec.
Pamphlet 1975).
68. 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
436 [Vol. 54
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Applying the rational basis test to each statute, the Louisiana
intestate succession law must rationally relate to the state interest in a
particular social fabric, whereas the classification of donors under the
Pennsylvania mortmain statute must effectuate the protection of de-
pendent heirs. The classification in Labine is neither over-inclusive
nor under-inclusive in relation to the state's interest in its social structure
while the classification in Cavill is susceptible to both challenges. A
further distinguishing factor is that a mortmain statute subverts the stated
intention of the decedent, while the intestate succession law at least
purports to honor it.
There are numerous grounds on which a mortmain statute can be
attacked. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated that state's
statute on equal protection grounds,69 although the orphan's court had
suggested equal protection, due process, and privileges and immunities
violations. In In re Small70 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia utilized the first amendment freedom of religion to
invalidate the District of Columbia mortmain statute, a ground peculiar-
ly available to challenge that jurisdiction's statute.7' There was also a
hint of equal protection "strict scrutiny" analysis when the court in In re
Small stated that "at least [religious institutions] should be in these cir-
cumstances in an equal position [with other beneficiaries]. I can see
no compelling Government necessity or otherwise for the Government to
interfere . ",72
A stronger weapon than equal protection to be raised against the
mortmain statute might be procedural due process. The dissent in
Cavill discussed it73 and a District of Columbia probate court relied
upon it in Doyle v. Key.74 The court in Doyle traced the denial of due
process:
[t]hat a will procured by undue influence is invalid . . . requires
no citation of authority. That the statute in question creates an
irrebuttable presumption of undue influence is also clear ...
Thus, if 18 D.C. Code 302 is valid, the legacies here involved are
void without regard to the factual absence of any kind of undue
influence. 75
69. See note 12 supra.
70. Administration No. 2507-70 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972).
71. The D.C. mortmain statute is unique in that it restricts only bequests to
religious organizations. D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (1973).
72. Administration No. 2507-70 at 4.
73. 329 A.2d at 510-11.
74. Administration No. 2188-72 (Super. Ct. D.C., P. Div., Feb. 13, 1975).
75. Id. at 6.
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Despite the linguistic maneuvers of the dissent in Cavill,78 the
practical effect of a legislative "prohibition" restricting charitable be-
quests is not distinguishable from an irrebuttable presumption of undue
influence: both restrict charities from taking bequests. Admittedly, the
presumption may be rebutted by "obtaining the consent of all other
interested parties"'7 or by "proving the existence of a prior will" 78 with
substantially the same gift. But the first solution allows a necessarily
interested party, the potential beneficiary, to be a judge in his own cause
and denies the charity a right to an impartial hearing on the presump-
tion. The second solution is only available when there is an extant prior
will.
Application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been
criticized by commentators as an ad hoc analysis utilized to circumvent
the often harsh standards of equal protection review. 9 The objection
has been that the challenge is actually a complaint of differing treatment
of persons "similarly situated with respect to the underlying purposes of
the rule."8 A challenge to a mortmain statute need not be vulnerable
to that objection. The challenge is that the classification is a depriva-
tion of due process; the classification is tantamount to an irrebuttable
presumption of undue influence and unprincipled activity by the chari-
table beneficiary. The purpose of the summary classification is not to
provide for governmental efficiency"' nor to maintain a social order 2
but to relieve individual heirs from the burden of establishing culpable
activity or corrupt intent on the part of charitable beneficiaries.8 3 The
classification fails as a denial of due process not justified by the statutory
purpose of circumventing due process of law. Furthermore, in a chal-
lenge to the validity of a mortmain statute, employment of the irrebutta-
ble presumption doctrine would permit success without reliance upon a
judicial conclusion of capricious classification.
76. 'This distinction between a conclusive presumption and a flat prohibition is not
one without a difference when the constitutional implications of a state's legislative
action are at stake." 329 A.2d at 510 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. E.g., Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rn'v.
449 (1975).
80. Id. at 465 n.78.
81. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
82. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
83. In order to submit the issue of undue influence to a jury, four elements must be
proven: (1) that the testator was susceptible to influence; (2) that there was opportunity
to influence; (3) that the influencer was disposed to influence the testator unduly; and
(4) that the coveted bequest actually resulted. Note, Testamentary Undue Influence in
Iowa, 18 DRAKE L. REv. 255, 258 (1969).
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Mortmain statutes have been whittled away at by state legisla-
tures,8 ' evaded by estate planners, 5 and criticized by scholars and
practicing lawyers.8 6 Finally they have been invalidated by the courts.
The combination of In re Small, In re Estate of CavilI, and Doyle v. Key
represents a frontal attack on the mortmain statute as an anachronistic
feudal holdover. Other courts confronted with challenges to mortmain
statutes should consider whether a state's role in policing the distribution
of a decedent's estate ought to extend beyond guaranteeing dependent
heirs continued support. Invalidation of a mortmain statute does not
deny those heirs a right to complain of undue influence by an offending
charitable organization. Rather, the intervention of the courts leaves
that remedy healthy while, hopefully, tolling the demise of the mortmain
statute.
ELIZABETH ANANIA
Constitutional Law-Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad:
A Contemporary Concept of the Public Forum
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad' the United States
Supreme Court held that municipal auditoriums in Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee "were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities."2 The Court looked in part to the traditional public forum
cases (those involving streets and parks) "I for the relevant criteria for its
84. E.g., "By recent amendment the Idaho mortmain statute now permits an
unlimited bequest to charity even within the proscribed thirty-day period, provided the
first $100,000 goes to the lineal descendants of the testator." I W. BOWE & D. PARKER,
supra note 4, § 3.16, at 1973-74 Supp. 15 (footnote omitted); see also Restrictions, supra
note 5, at 297.
85. Various "avoidance techniques" are catalogued in Fisch, Restrictions on Chari-
table Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F. 307, 325-31 (1964). These include substitutional and
conditional dispositions, in terroram and no-contest clauses, dependent relative revoca-
tion, contracts to bequeath and inter vivos dispositions.
86. Id.; Hollinger, Decedents' Estates & Trusts Laws, Annual Survey of Pennsyl-
vania Legal Developments, 45 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 221, 229 (1974); Remick, supra note 66;
and Restrictions, supra note 5, at 298-99.
1. 420U.S. 546 (1975).
2. Id. at 555.
3. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
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conclusion, and thus demonstrated that the application of these histori-
cal tests is not to be confined to the particular settings in which they
were developed. As a result, the Court did more than declare two
municipal auditoriums in Chattanooga to be public forums: it evidenced
a willingness to apply public forum analysis whenever a public facility is
denied to those who desire to exercise their first amendment rights.
When the Municipal Auditorium Board of the City of Chattanooga
rejected Southeastern's application for the production of the rock musi-
cal "Hair" solely on the strength of outside reports that the production
was obscene, the petitioner sought injunctive relief in the federal courts.'
Although both the district court5 and the court of appeals" upheld the
Board's action, finding conduct in the production, apart from speech, to
be obscene and thus violative of city and state laws against public
nudity, 7 the Supreme Court reversed.' The Court was not concerned
with whether the play were obscene or not,' refusing even to review the
reasons behind the Board's rejection of it, or the standards upon which
the Board had based its decision.'0 Rather, the majority chose to view
the main issue before the Court as whether the Board in its managerial
capacity could function as do private individual proprietors-outside the
strictures of the first and fourteenth amendments." Finding the audito-
rium to be a public forum, the Court emphatically repudiated the
(1939). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
4. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465, 468 (E.D. Tenn.
1972).
5. Id. at 477.
6. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1973).
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1013, 39-3003 (1971 Supp.); CHArTANOOGA, TENN.,
CODE §§ 6-4, 25-28. See 420 U.S. at 550-51. The Court rejected the Board's argument
that it would itself violate the law if it approved Southeastern's application: "Hair" had
not been judicially declared to be obscene, and "respondents did not parmit the show
to go on and rely on law enforcement authorities to prosecute for anything illegal that
occurred. Rather, they denied the application in anticipation that the production would
violate the law." Id.
8. 420 U.S. at 552.
9. Id. at 557-59. Accord, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334
F. Supp. 634, 639 (N.D. Ga. 1971). See also Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. 420 U.S. at 552, 559, 562. The Board had looked to a booklet prepared for the
dedication of the auditorium to find support for its actions. The booklet stated in part
that the Board was entrusted with the responsibility of insuring that "civic, education-
al, patriotic and charitable organizations and associations may have a common meeting
place to discuss and further the upbuilding and general welfare of the city and
surrounding territory." Further, the auditorium was "to be devoted for cultural
advancement, and for clean, healthful, entertainment which will make for the upbuilding
of a better citizenship." See id. at 549 n.4. See also note 61 infra.
11. 420 U.S. at 553-56.
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Board's claims of proprietary privilege.' 2 Public officials charged with
the management of a public facility that is found to be a public forum
must recognize the constitutional limitations upon their proprietary
discretion. The Board's failure to appreciate the nature of its responsi-
bility led it to deny the use of the auditorium without regard for the
procedural safeguards dictated by the first amendment.' 3 Therefore,
the Court concluded, without reaching questions of the validity of the
Board's standards, that "[dienying use of the municipal facility under
the circumstances present here constituted the prior restraint."14  Be-
cause this prior restraint was accomplished without adherence to the
minimum procedural requirements of Freedman v. Maryland,'5 the
Board's refusal was impermissible. 16
Holding that a municipal auditorium could indeed be a public
forum, the Court provided itself with the basis for a due process analysis
of petitioner's claims.17 Clearly, one of the most valued incidents of
private ownership is the right to exclude others, and to regulate their
conduct once admitted, without breaking first amendment command-
12. The Auditorium Board had advanced the claim in the district court that, acting
in a proprietary capacity, it should be accorded the managerial discretion allowed to
private owners. Although the district court ruled against this contention, see note 64
infra, it was again argued on brief to the Supreme Court. The Court's answer was that
"[r]espondent's action was no less a prior restraint because the public facility under their
control happened to be municipal theaters." 420 U.S. at 555.
13. Professor Monaghan has coined the term "First Amendment due process" to
describe the approach that the Supreme Court has adopted to handle the procedural
issues presented in first amendment cases. Surveying a long series of cases, capped by
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), he observes that, "the Court has placed
little reliance upon the due process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments,
but instead has turned directly to the first amendment as the source of the rules....
[D]oes the procedure show 'the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression?' [380
U.S. at 48]" Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 518-
19 (1970).
14. 420 U.S. at 556.
15. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). In Freedman the Court held that where a prior restraint
is imposed which calls into question the protected nature of speech, "only a procedure
requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." Id. at 58.
Therefore, (1) the burden is on the state to either issue a permit or initiate judicial
proceedings, (2) any restraint prior to judicial review must be brief, preserving the status
quo, and (3) a prompt judicial determination must be provided. Id. at 58-59.
16. Not all prior restraints are unconstitutional. See note 60 and accompanying
text infra. See generally Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
17. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the Court refused
to find a municipal bus system to be an appropriate public forum. Therefore, the city
was allowed to prohibit political advertising on its buses even though other commercial
advertising was permitted. See note 54 infra. Thus, because "[n]o First Amendment
forum is here to be found," the Court held that, "[i]n these circumstances there is no
First or Fourteenth Amendment violation." 418 U.S. at 304. See also Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), discussed in text accompanying note 36 infra.
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ments. 18 Likewise, municipal properties, never expressly dedicated for
purposes of free expression, are not necessarily of right open to all peo-
ple as a public forum.' 9 However, once a place has been declared by
the courts to be a public forum the first and fourteenth amendments
are called into play, and property "rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." 0 The ease
with which the Court moved the idea of the public forum out of the
streets and indoors is not without support in the principal cases which
have shaped the public forum concept.
The first pronouncement of a modem theory of the public forum
came in 1939 when the United States Supreme Court, in Hague v.
C.I.O.,2' overruled Davis v. Massachusetts"2 which had confirmed in the
states unlimited control over access to, and the use of their public parks
and streets.23 In Hague the Court upheld the right of labor activists to
peacefully assemble, speak and distribute literature in the city streets,
and therefore struck down the licensing ordinance which had been used
arbitrarily to deny them a forum. The Court explicitly renounced the
absolute dominion contentions of Davis, postulating what has been
called "a kind of first amendment easement"'2 4 right to a public forum
in the people:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have im-
memorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
18. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972): "In addressing this
issue, it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the
rights of free speech and assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by the
owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only." Id. at
567. Cf. Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) and Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), where even privately owned properties, opened to the
public, were found to be public forums. See generally Comment, The Public Forum
from Marsh to Lloyd, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 159 (1974).
19. See cases cited note 17 supra.
20. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
21. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
22. 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
23. The Court in Davis quoted with approval the language of then Justice Holmes
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts:
"There is no evidence before us to show that the power of the legislature
over the common is less than its power over any other park dedicated to the use
of the public, or over public streets, the legal title to which is in a city or town.
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member
of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."
167 U.S. at 47, quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
24. Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Or.
REv. 1, 13.
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Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi-
zens.
25
Thus, in order to give meaning to first amendment guarantees, a state is
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment from divesting the public of
access to these historical forums. 26
The Court, in Hague, confined its opinion to a narrowly conceived
concept of the public forum, based on common law property notions: 27
only the streets and parks were considered. Although the rationale of
Hague has continued to be applicable in the streets and parks cases, 28 in
recent years, as local governments assumed an increased role in the
development of public facilities, it began to be questioned whether the
right to a public forum were to be restricted to these traditional public
places. In two major civil rights cases of the 1960's, Brown v. Louisi-
ana29 and Adderley v. Florida,"° the Supreme Court indicated its answer,
displaying a disposition to adopt a more generalized approach to public
forum analysis.
In Brown five blacks staged a sit-in demonstration in a public
library, in protest of segregated library facilites, and were arrested when
they refused to disburse.31 Reversing their convictions, the Court found
unconstitutional state action in the discriminatory enforcement of a local
ordinance prohibiting disruptive conduct in public buildings. 32 After
noting that the demonstrations had been conducted in a quiet and
peaceful manner, the Court declared such conduct to be fully protected
by the first and fourteenth amendments,3 3 and affirmed the right of the
petitioners to stage a "reasonable, orderly, and limited" protest in a
public facility where they had "every right to be. 34  Although not
historically a public forum, the library was elevated to that status
through the combined effect of the first amendment and the equal
protection clause. But, as the majority was careful to acknowledge, had
25. 307 U.S. at 515.
26. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1937).
27. See generally Kalven, supra note 24; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public
Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233.
28. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Staub v.
City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
29. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
30. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
31. 383 U.S. at 136-38.
32. Id. at 142.
33. Id. at 139-42.
34. Id. at 142.
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there been "disturbance of others, . . . disruption of library activi-
ties, . . .violation of any library regulations," the issue presented
would -have been quite different.35 Thus it is clear that the Court, in
finding a public forum, looked beyond traditional concepts to other
relevant considerations: (1) was the place open to the public; (2)
would the form of speech advocated interfere with the normal functions
to which -the facility was committed; (3) did the state by its actions deny
equal access to an appropriate forum for protected expression?
The next year in Adderley 8 the Court was called upon to consider
the public forum issue again, this time in the light of Brown. Demon-
strators were convicted of trespass when they refused to leave the
grounds of a county jail.37 The Supreme Court affirmed their convic-
tions, answering each of the questions suggested in Brown against
contentions that the jail was a suitable public forum. The jail premises
were not open to the public, at any time, as a forum for expressive
activities,38 because such activity was inconsistent with the security
purposes for which the jail was built.39 Therefore, over a strong dissent
which viewed the jail as "an obvious center for protest," 40 the majority
found the jail to be "so clearly committed to other purposes that [its]
use for the airing of grievances is anomalous."'41  Finding no public
forum, the Court upheld the statute which gave to the state the "power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated. 42
By the 1970's the Supreme Court was ready to announce an
approach -to public forum analysis that in no way depended upon the
accidents of history. Summarizing the developments in Brown and
Adderley, the Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford43 formulated its
test:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate
the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reason-
able." Although a silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a pub-
35. Id.
36. 385U.S. 39 (1966).
37. Id. at 40.
38. Id. at 47.
39. Id. at 41, 45.
40. Id. at 49.
41. Id. at 54. Although the words are those of Justice Douglas, admitting in his
dissent that not every public place is also a suitable public forum, I have chosen to
appropriate them as the best statement of the case holding: the majority took Justice
Douglas at his word.
42. Id. at 47.
43. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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lie library, Brown v. Louisiana, making a speech in the reading
room almost certainly would. That same speech should be per-
fectly appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal ac-
tivity of a particular place at a particular time.44
In Grayned, students picketing a high school on adjacent sidewalks were
arrested and fined for violating a municipal ordinance banning disrup-
tive noise and conduct near school buildings while classes were in
session. 4' Reaffirming its holding in Tinker v., Des Moines School
District4" that a school campus can be an appropriate public forum, 47
the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the ordinance as a constitution-
ally permissible time, place, and manner regulation designed to protect
school activities.4" Thus, it is necessary to consider the purposes to
which a public facility is devoted, first in order to determine whether its
use as a public forum would be inconsistent with that purpose, and
second, so that reasonable standards for time, place, and manner regula-
tions can be devised.
Although the test as stated in Grayned casts public forum analysis
primarily in terms of appropriateness of use considerations, the Supreme
Court, on the same day that it decided Grayned, found a public forum
to have been created on equal access grounds. In Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley," the Court struck down a city ordinance which
allowed labor picketing near school facilities while prohibiting any other
type of picketing in the same areas.50 Such "selective exclusion" was
held to run afoul of both the equal protection clause and the first
amendment. 51 Public places open to some must be open to all; and if
appropriate as forums for some points of view, such places must be
44. Id. at 116 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 105-06.
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Court upheld the right of students to
wear black armbands to protest against the war in Vietnam, as long as their conduct did
not substantially interfere with school functions.
47. 408 U.S. at 117.
48. Id. at 121.
49. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
50. Id. at 94.
51. Necessarily then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the
First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express
less favored or more controversial views.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, govern-
ment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say.
Id. at 96. Accord, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (concurring opinion);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
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made available to all points of view. 52  The Court did not hesitate to
find a deprivation of public forum rights even though the state was
unaware that by its actions it had provided one.5 3
After Grayned and Mosley it was apparent that the Court left
behind the narrow theory of the public forum conceived in Hague. In
these two opinions the Supreme Court expressed the principles of Brown
and Adderley in yet broader terms, reflecting a commitment to apply
public forum analysis in new and varying contexts. Although perhaps
the Court retreated somewhat from this stand in Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights4 when it declined to find a city-owned bus to be a
"First Amendment forum," in Southeastern Promotions the Court re-
confirmed its commitment to an expansive theory of the public forum.5
The Court in Southeastern Promotions quickly tested the audito-
riums against this adaptable public forum concept, before turning to the
question of prior restraint. The petitioners did not claim the right of
access to a "facility primarily serving a competing use. Nor was
rejection of the application based on any regulation of time, place, or
manner related to the nature of the facility or applications from other
users."5 6  Thus it is clear that under the rationale of Grayned, the
auditoriums were not disqualified from being suitable for use as public
forums. The Auditorium Board made no attempt to justify its actions
52. See generally Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DuK. L.I. 931, where it is contended that, "The first amendment has developed,
through the vagueness and overbreadth line of cases, its own equal protection clause,
capable of achieving the same results as the fourteenth amendment .... " Id. at 951
(footnotes omitted).
53. Cf. Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
54. 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The majority concluded that the city could constitution-
ally "[limit] access to its transit system advertising space in order to minimize chances
of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive
audience." Id. at 304. Thus it found no public forum. In a strongly worded dissent,
Justice Brennan reviewed the history of the public forum concept and concluded that the
buses were indeed public forums:
In the circumstances of this case, however, we need not decide whether
public transit cars must be made available as forums for the exercise of First
Amendment rights. By accepting commercial and public service advertising,
the city effectively waived any argument that advertising in its transit cars is
incompatible with the rapid transit system's primary function of providing
transportation. A forum for communication was voluntarily established when
the city installed the physical facilities for the advertisements and, by contract
with Metromedia, created the necessary administrative machinery for regulat-
ing access to that forum.
Id. at 313-14.
55. In fact the Court explicitly rejected the applicability of Lehman in the case at
hand. 420 U.S. at 556.
56. Id. at 555 (footnotes omitted).
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on the grounds that the auditoriums could not sufficiently accomodate
the production.57  And certainly at no time could the Board deny that it
regularly made the facilities available to others as forums for public
expression, for it was just for such purposes that the buildings were
dedicated. 58 Therefore, under the holding of Mosley a right of equal
access to the facilities for purposes of protected expression inured .to the
public as a whole. The auditoriums were indeed public forums.
Once the Court found the auditoriums to be public forums, the
ultimate disposition of the case was clearly dictated. The Board's denial
of the use of these public forums was "indistinguishable in its censor-
ing effect from the official actions consistently identified as prior re-
straints in a long line of [the] Courts decisions."" Although a prior
restraint is not unconstitutional per se,60 those who would control access
to a public forum may not go farther than to establish such limited
regulations as are not incompatible with the purposes of the forum.61
And if those standards would condition the right of access to the public
facility upon the type of expressive activity proposed, only after a
judicial determination that the speech is unprotected can the authorities
deny the use of the public forum on grounds such as obscenity.6 2
Because the Auditorium Board failed to recognize these constitutional
constraints upon its role in the management of a public forum, it
neglected to insure that its rejection of "Hair" "' [took] place under
procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship
system.' "63 Although inadvertently infirm, the Board's refusal was
nevertheless effective in.cutting off public forum rights in an unconsti-
tutional manner. As such, the Board's actions could not be upheld.
57. Id.
58. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
59. 420 U.S. at 552, citing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958); Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,451-52 (1938).
60. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Cf. Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
61. 420 U.S. at 553. Accord, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. at 143 (The Court
emphasized that although "[a] State or its instrumentality may, of course, regulate the
use of its libraries or other public facilities, ... it may not invoke regulations as to
use-whether they are ad hoc or general-as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in
lawful, constitutionally protected exercise of their fundamental rights."); and Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. at 515-16 ('The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks ...must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.").
62. 420 U.S. at 559-60. See also note 15 supra.
63. 420 U.S. at 559, quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. at 58.
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In dissent, Mr. Justice Rehnquist sought to discredit the public
forum foundations of the majority opinion by resurrecting the argument
that the Board could constitutionally deny access to the auditoriums
consonant with its proprietary as opposed to its governmental duties."4
Insisting that in prior decisions the Supreme Court had limited itself to
finding a public forum only in settings functionally similar to the streets
and parks, he questioned the validity of applying the same analysis to
such dissimilar facilties as public auditoriums, "which must of ne-
cessity schedule performances by a process of inclusion and exclu-
sion."8' 5 If to find the auditoriums to be public forums is to deny any
"selective role whatsoever" to the Board in the management of them, by
what standards are managers of municipal auditoriums to decide which
speakers shall have the forum?" '66
The Court acknowledged that eventually many of the questions
raised by Justice Rehnquist would have to be resolved, but it expressly
declined to confront them in Southeastern Promotions."' At no time,
however, did the Court indicate that the Board could serve no "constitu-
tionally permissible role" in the selection of productions to be presented
in the auditoriums. The licensing standards appropriate to the streets
and parks cases are not be be transported wholesale to other forums
where they may well be inapplicable. For, "[e]ach medium of expres-
sion, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each has its own problems."6 8 Assuming that
the requisite procedural safeguards were incorporated, the Board was
clearly not prohibited from establishing guidelines necessary to the
64. 420 U.S. at 570-74. The district court had rejected the proposition that
characterization of the Board's actions would help to determine the case: "Accordingly,
it is apparent that whether the Board acts in a governmental capacity or in a proprietary
capacity it nevertheless remains a public body, and as such it cannot differentiate or
discriminate where the sole basis of that differentiation or discrimination is for some
constitutionally impermissible [sic] reason." 341 F. Supp. at 470. Accord, Southeast-
em Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City, 459 F.2d 282, 283 (10th Cir. 1972); Southeast-
em Promotions, Ltd. v. City of West Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (W.D.N.C.
1971). But see Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 201-03 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). See also United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44 (4th Cir.
1971); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946).
65. 420 U.S. at 570.
66. See id. at 572-74.
67. Id. at 562. "The standard, whatever it may be, must be implemented under a
system that assures prompt judicial review with a minimal restriction of First Amend-
ment rights necessary under the circumstances." Id.
68. Id. at 557, citing Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952);
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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successful production of theatrical programs.6 9 The Court simply re-
fused to go farther than to confirm the fact that a public forum may not
be run as if it were a privately owned facility, leaving it up to the
municipalities to develop the" 'narrow, objective, and definite standards
to guide the licensing authority' 70 required by the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The fundamental implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Southeastern Promotions are to be derived from the public forum under-
pinnings of its holding. That the Court never reached the substantive
obscenity questions raised in the lower courts should put those accounta-
ble for the management of municipal facilities on notice that they must
apprise themselves of the potential public forum- ramifications that
might well attend their actions. And since the Court refused to lay
down specific guidelines, the burden of devising sufficiently narrow
standards to govern the managing authority in its function was defaulted
to the states. Furthermore, lower courts are charged with the responsi-
bility of exploring the public forum consequences of governmental action
that would frustrate the exercise of first amendment rights. Thus, the
Court recognized that "[t]o permit the continued building of our
politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual,"' '
those forums appropriately public must be kept open to constitutionally
protected expression.
JAMES M. PHILLIPS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Standing to Sue in Exdusionary Zoning
Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited
Catch-22, Yosarian observed, involved a simple test with condi-
tions defined so that it was impossible to meet them.1 In an opinion
69. See note 61 and accompanying text supra. See also Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. City of Atlanta, 334 F. Supp. 634, 641 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Charlotte, 333 F. Supp. 345, 351 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
70. 420 U.S. at 553, quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
150-51 (1969).
71. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972).
1. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 47 (1955).
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superficially praiseworthy for its simplification of the test for standing in
federal courts, the United States Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin2
followed Heller's cue. The Court in Warth so defined the terms of this
procedural test that most persons ohallenging a zoning ordinance on
grounds of unlawful economic exclusion will never get into federal
court. The practical result forces low and nioderate income persons
first to obtain suburban housing before they can challenge a zoning
ordinance that effectively precludes their acquiring it.
Warth involved the zoning ordinance of Penfield, New York, an
incorporated suburb of Rochester. The ordinance allocated ninety-
eight percent 3 of the town's vacant land to single-family detached hous-
ing, with less than one percent4 reserved for multi-family structures
(apartments and townhouses).5 Further ordinance requirements relat-
ing to lot size, floor area, and density of persons per acre combined
effectively to price low and moderate income persons out of the Penfield
housing market. 6
Several groups of plaintiffs alleged that Penfield's zoning ordi-
nance, on its face and as applied, excluded low and moderate income
persons from living in Penfield, in violation of their constitutional rights.
A number of persons who had unsuccessfully sought to find housing in
Penfield alleged that the ordinance forced them to reside in less attrac-
tive and rewarding environments, which additionally resulted in higher
commuting expenses. They argued that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it violated their right to economic equal protection. A
2. 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
3. The opinion of the court of appeals, 495 F.2d 1187, 1189 (2d Cir. 1974), gives
this figure as ninety percent. There is no indication whether the difference is real or
typographical, and if the latter, which figure is correct.
4. The Court indicated that only .3% of the land allocated for residential use
(ninety-eight percent of available land) was zoned for multi-family housing. 95 S. Ct.
at 2203.
5. The ordinance had been in effect for ten years at the time of suit. See id. at
2203.
6. The Court found that only two projects for low or moderate cost housing had
been proposed in the ten years the Penfield ordinance was in effect prior to suit. One
had failed to secure the requisite approvals from the town government three years prior
to suit. The other was pending at the time of suit. Both of these projects anticipated use
of rent subsidization. Low or moderate cost housing allegedly was unavailable in
Penfield without subsidization. Seeid. at 2208 n.15.
7. The essence of these plaintiffs' claim was a violation of equal protection based
upon economic exclusion. The record indicates that at least some of these plaintiffs
were members of racial or ethnic minorities, and hence could have brought suit on
grounds of racial exclusion. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, Fair Housing Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970). However, plaintiffs'
attorneys, in briefs to the court of appeals, specifically sought standing only on economic
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group of Rochester taxpayers alleged that Penfield's failure to provide
for its fair share of the region's total housing needs resulted in Rochester
taxpayers having to subsidize a disproportionate share of these needs.8
A civic group concerned with housing sued on behalf of its members
who lived in Penfield, arguing that they had been deprived of the
benefits of living in an economically mixed community.9 In addition,
two associations, one of developers and one of builders, claimed mone-
tary damages for deprivation of profits they would have made in con-
structing low and moderate cost housing had it not been for the exclu-
sionary effect of the zoning ordinance. In sum, these plaintiffs sought
(1) to have the ordinance declared unconstitutional, (2) to enjoin the
town from enforcing the existing ordinance and to require it to develop
a new one correcting past inequities, and (3) monetary damages.
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and had failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 10 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision, reaching only the standing question.11  The United States
Supreme Court affirmed in a five to four decision.
The Court held that none of the plaintiffs had demonstrated a
personal injury, stating that,
the fact that these petitioners share attributes common to persons
who may have been excluded from residence in the town is an
insufficient predicate for the conclusion that petitioners -them-
selves have been excluded, or that respondents' assertedly illegal
actions have violated their rights.12
Although the Court declined to say exactly what would satisfy the
requirement of personal injury, it did indicate that some demonstrable
interest in a particular project, in which plaintiffs intended to reside,
would suffice to provide standing.13  Plaintiffs here lacked such an
grounds. Accordingly, the Court distinguished Warth from racial exclusion cases which
could have been used to establish standing. See note 14 infra.
8. Note that this is the same ground accepted by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in the recent, perhaps landmark, case of NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67 N.L 151, 336 A.2d
713 (1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3053 (U.S. July 8, 1975) (No. 38). See
note 39 infra for a discussion of this case.
9. 95 S. Ct. at 2212 & n.21. Here, too, petitioners' claims were based on eco-
nomic, not racial grounds, despite precedent on point that could have established standing
on racial grounds. See note 14 infra.
10. The Court also noted that the case should not proceed as a class action. Given
that the plaintiffs claiming to represent a class lacked a basis for suit, the class action
issue is moot. 95 S. Ct. at 2207.
11. 495 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).
12. 95 S. Ct. at 2207.
13. Id. at2210n.18.
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interest, and accordingly failed to meet the "injury in fact" requirements
for standing. The associations and the Rochester taxpayers were held
to be suing for rights of third parties, and hence were not proper parties
to bring suit. 4
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent bitterly denounced the opinion as
fabricating procedural snares to insure that the substantive questions
raised would not be reached."5 He argued that according to prior
decisions the injuries alleged were sufficient to allow standing,'0 and he
regarded the Court's failure to so hold as "an indefensible hostility to the
claim on the merits.' 7
STANDING TO SUE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The law of standing is predicated upon the Article HI requirement
that disputes in federal courts present a "case" or "controversy" between
the parties.' 8  The Supreme Court historically has construed this to
mean that the plaintiff must be a proper party to bring the action in
question.' 9 In Baker v. Carr,2" the Court defined this requirement by
stating that plaintiffs must allege "a personal stake in the outcome of the
14. Although the Court dealt at length with the grounds for refusing standing to
each group of plaintiffs, its decision in each instance involved lack of an injury in fact.
(1) The Court rejected the Rochester taxpayers' claim involving regional housing needs
(note that this argument was made on equal protection grounds, not under state statute
as in Mt. Laurel). The Court accordingly found assertions of personal injury too
attenuated, and noted that any remaining claim asserted only third parties' rights. Id.
at 2209-11. (2) The civic organization, nine percent of whose members were Penfield
residents, was said to be asserting the rights of third parties. Regarding the Penfield
residents, the Court implied that standing would have been granted had petitioners
alleged racial exclusion under Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972) (asserting lost benefits of living in a racially mixed community). However, the
Court noted plaintiffs' refusal to plead on this ground and distinguished Trailicante. Id.
at 2212-13. (3) The association of builders asserted no instance where a project had
been precluded by any action of the town relating to the ordinance, and hence had shown
no injury. Id. at 2214. (4) The association of developers asserted only one instance of
such preclusion, which had occurred three years prior to suit. Id. at 2214-15. The
record indicated no evidence to show a live and concrete dispute, and the Court refused
to hear this claim essentially on grounds of mootness. The Court noted that were there
a live dispute, the question of exhausting remedies would then arise. id. at 2214 n.23.
15. Id. at 2216.
16. Id. at 2218.
17. Id. at 2216.
18. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
19. The Court historically has sought to avoid spurious or unnecessary suits. See,
e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). See generally Davis, The
Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 450 (1970); Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REv. 645 (1973).
20. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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controversy"21 in order to insure that a favorable decision by the Court
would personally benefit plaintiffs.
Prior to 196.8, the Court's standing test required proof by the
plaintiff of many of the substantive elements of his case.22  This test
involved substantive evaluation of the legal provisions under which the
plaintiff sought relief, demonstration of the extent and nature of injury,
and a showing that the plaintiff fell within the scope of the contested
statute or constitutional guarantee.23 Additionally, the Court developed
closely related, though non-constitutional, discretionary rules relating to
standing. The most important discretionary rule required that plain-
tiffs' claims be based upon their own injuries, thus barring the use of
courts as a political forum to try suits on the behalf of third parties.24
Beginning in 1968 with Flast v. Cohen25 and continuing through
Warth, the Court revamped the requirements for standing in federal
courts. 6  In cases prior to Flast, the Court treated the concepts of
standing and justiciability almost interchangeably and did not distin-
guish between the plaintiff and the merits of the case he was bringing.
In subsequent cases the Court established specific standing requirements
relating solely to the person bringing suit. Exemplary of this shift was
the 1970 case of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp,27 which established a two-pronged test for standing under
21. Id. at 204. This language was a statement of existing philosophy, and still
reflects the philosophical underpinnings of standing. The changes in the law of standing
have concerned the test for implementing this philosophy.
22. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
23. See Davis, supra note 19; Scott, supra note 19. Such statutory evaluation often
had the effect of insuring standing in cases where the general test used under Article III
left the standing question in doubt. E.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940).
24. E.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943). See also United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1953).
For a detailed discussion on standing and the rights of third parties, see Note, 88 HA.v.
L. REv. 423 (1974) (constitutional jus tertii). Note that this is the converse of the
requirement that a plaintiff must assert a personal injury. See the Court's discussion, 95
S. Ct. at 2205-06.
25. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Although Flast has since been pigeonholed as limited to
taxpayers' suits brought under the first amendment, it broke with prior tests for standing
and initiated the revision of federal standing law.
26. The major cases in this process have been (in order of decision) Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); its companion
case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669 (1973); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S.
208 (1974); Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Although Data Processing was brought under section 10
of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), the language of the
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Article m11: (1) that plaintiff suffer an "injury in fact," and (2) that
plaintiffs interests fall within the "zone of interests to be regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. 12 8  In creating the
"zone of interests" test, the Court sought to maintain a screening
mechanism for invoking its discretionary authority not to hear a case for
policy reasons. 29  The dissent in Data Processing argued that the zone
of interest test concerned reviewability of the subject matter of the case,
not the particular plaintiff bringing suit, and hence was not an appropri-
ate test for determining standing. The dissent further argued that the
Court could exercise its discretionary powers under the rubric of justici-
ability instead of standing. Notably, cases subsequent to Data Process-
ing turned on the question of injury in fact, not zone of interest, and by
1974 a plurality of five of the Justices in United States v. Richardson0
favored abandoning the zone of interest test altogether.3 ' The Court,
however, has been careful to note that while it has markedly reduced the
requirements for standing, it has not abandoned "the requirement that
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury."3' 2 The
rationale for maintaining this requirement reflects the Court's antipathy
toward deciding "political questions"3 and its concern that the remedy
provided be "no broader than required by the precise facts to which the
court's ruling would be applied. '3 4
Two problems in the revision of standing law are noteworthy. First,
although the cases indicate an attempt to standardize the test for stand-
ing in varied factual contexts, the Court has persistently repeated the
warning that generalizations about standing are hazardous.3, Second,
the Court's opinions have been noteworthy in their failure to define
"injury in fact.""0  Given the Court's opinions through Richardson, a
definitional process appeared imminent.
opinion refers to both statutory and constitutional claims. Subsequent decisions have
indicated that the case does apply to nonstatutory suits. See cases cited note 26 supra.
28. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
29. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
30. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
31. The four dissenting Justices and Justice Powell, concurring, were of this
opinion. Id. at 180, 197, 202, 235.
32. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
33. See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488-89 (1923).
34. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
35. This has historically been true of the Court's standing decisions, prompting the
comment by Professor Freund that the concept of standing is one of "the most
amorphous in the entire domain of public law." In Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
467-68 (1966).
36. This fact was noted in the court of appeal's decision in Warth, 495 F.2d at
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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
The Supreme Court has heard less than a handful of zoning cases
in the past fifty years.37  Virtually all zoning problems have been
litigated at the state court level. Suits in state court typically challenge a
specific ordinance as failing to comply with the state's zoning enabling
act. Standing requirements, usually requiring that the plaintiff exhibit
some proprietary interest, are generally found within these statutes. In
many states, these requirements have recently been liberalized to include
persons who lack proprietary interests but are nevertheless affected by
the zoning ordinance. 38
State remedies have been sufficient for virtually all zoning contro-
versies except those involving racial discrimination. These controversies
have been brought in federal court, under civil rights legislation, 9 the
Fair Housing Act of 1968,0 and the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Federal courts generally have invalidated zon-
1190. The Court has specified only very broad parameters for the "injury in fact" test.
For example, in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the Court indicated that
"[a]bstract injury is not enough." Id. at 494. Similarly, the Court in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), required "some threatened or actual injury resulting
from the putatively illegal action." Id. at 617. No actual definition of "injury in fact"
had been given prior to Warth.
37. The landmark case establishing zoning as a proper exercise of police power was
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). There have been two pure zoning
cases since Euclid. Beery v. Houghton, 273 U.S. 671 (1927) (which merely followed
Euclid); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding single-family
zoning). See generally N. WILLIAMS, 3 AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE
POLICE POWER (1975) [hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS].
38. Most statutes require persons suing under them to show a proprietary or
equitable interest in land within the zoned area subject to dispute. However, recent
decisions at the state court level have expanded the basis for suit. Of particular note in
the context of economic exclusion is Mt. Laurel. See note 8 supra. The New Jersey
Supreme Court there held that zoning ordinances which failed to provide for the
municipality's fair share of the regional housing needs are challengeable under the state
zoning enabling act. This conclusion is seen as following from a regionalized conception
of Euclid's public welfare language. See Bums, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclu-
sionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 179 (1975). A number of'
commentators see Mt. Laurel as setting the trend in state courts in economic exclusion-
ary zoning litigation. Bums, supra; Kushner, Land Use Litigation and Low Income
Housing: Mandating Regional Fair Share Plans, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 10 (1975);
Williams, supra note 37. The implications of this development in terms of who can sue
is to stretch the requisite interest for suit to a regional scope, thereby including taxpayers
of other municipalities in the region and other municipalities themselves. For discus-
sions of other trends in exclusionary zoning decisions in the state courts, see generally
Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The Second Generation of Cases
and the Environment, 6 Sw. U.L. REv. 88 (1974); Note, 5 MEMPHIS STATE U.L. REv.
251 (1975).
39. Generally under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970).
40. Id. § 3601 et seq.
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ing provisions which embody racial discrimination.41
Cases involving economic, as opposed to racial, exclusion have
appeared only recently. Some of these suits have been brought in state
courts under state enabling acts.42 Others, based solely on a constitu-
tional right of economic equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment, have been brought in federal court. Inasmuch as these latter suits
are not brought under state statute or under a federal statute,43 both of
which have standing requirements, plaintiffs must comply with the
general requirements for standing under Article III as construed by the
Supreme Court. Determination of these requirements accordingly fixes
the scope of litigation in an economic exclusionary zoning context.44
CATCH-22 REVISITED
The Court in Warth used the context of exclusionary zoning to
further revise the law of standing, much as it had in cases of varied fact
situations since 1968. Recognizing the plurality decision in Richardson,
the Court used a single test, injury in fact, as the determinant of standing
under Article III. "Zone of interests" was not mentioned in the
opinion. One may accordingly draw the conclusion that Warth's signif-
icance in the context of standing litigation is to remove the zone of
interest test established in Data Processing.
Despite this step toward simplification, however, the Court compli-
cated the entire standing issue, and severely restricted the substantive
bases for suit, at least in economic exclusionary zoning litigation,
through the manner in which it defined "injury in fact." The cases
prior to Warth seemed to indicate that almost any showing of monetary
or opportunity losses resulting from the alleged statutory or constitution-
al violation constituted a sufficient "injury" to meet the standing re-
quirement and allow the suit to be heard on the merits.43 Warth, in
contrast, construed the statutory/constitutional violation itself to be the
requisite "injury" that must be shown to establish standing. The Court
stated that alleged monetary and opportunity losses might measure the
extent of harm, but such losses without the showing of the violation of a
41. See 95 S. Ct. at 2209 n.17 for a listing of a number of major cases in this area.
All of these cases involved particular projects and instances of discrimination.
42. See the discussion of the Mt. Laurel case note 39 supra.
43. E.g., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).
44. See WILLIAMS, supra note 37, for a discussion of the courts' treatment of cases
asserting the doctrine of economic equal protection.
45. See 95 S. Ct. at 2218.
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right are not sufficient to warrant suit.46  This is clearly inconsistent
with the Court's prior use of the term injury. For example, in Sierra
Club v. Morton the Court recognized an aesthetic and environmental
interest in land about to be despoiled as sufficient to warrant standing in
a suit alleging a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.4T
Clearly an allegation that one's aesthetic interests have been or are about
to be harmed is a far cry from a claim that one's statutory/constitutional
rights have been violated. Had the Court used the Warth test, it would
have refuted an aesthetical/environmental basis for attaining standing in
Morton. It would also have denied standing in Data Processing, in
which an alleged violation of plaintiff's economic interests was found
sufficient to clear the standing hurdle.
In Warth the Court thus retained the catch-words of its test for
standing under Article rI-injury in fact-but changed what those
words mean. In an exclusionary zoning context, the result is that the
plaintiff must demonstrate a specific instance of exclusion involving a
specific project or parcel of land in order to attain standing.4 Accord-
ingly, by its construction of "injury in fact," the Court requires a
proprietary interest for zoning litigation.49  One may postulate that the
Court decided upon a final result (proprietary interest) and then rede-
fined "injury in fact" as the easiest way of arriving at it. It might be
noted, however, that by raising a proprietary interest to a federal consti-
tutional requirement in zoning litigation, the Court is reverting to the
pre-1968 confusion in standing cases by failing to differentiate between
the person bringing suit and the justiciability of his claim. This seems
to obviate the entire line of standing decisions since 1968-unless future
decisions manage to limit the construction used in Warth to an exclu-
sionary zoning context.50
46. Id. at2207n.13.
47. 405 U.S. at 738.
48. One has to be excluded from something. Saying one has been excluded from
the whole town fails to demonstrate when and how this exclusion occurred. Such
specificity requires an instance of exclusion from a particular project. Mr. Justice
Brennan asserts that the effect of the decision is to require proof on the merits in order
to gain standing. See 95 S. Ct. at 2220.
49. Note that this result is strangely similar to the traditional requirements for
standing under the state enabling acts. See WILLIAMS, supra note 37.
50. It is interesting to note that the Court's construction of injury left the dissent in
the anomalous position of arguing that the interests of at least three of the sets of
plaintiffs (i.e., the individual petitioners, the civic association, and the group of develop-
ers), taken as a whole, justified standing, and that the Court erred in treating "each set
of plaintiffs as if it were prosecuting a separate lawsuit, refusing to recognize that the
interests of any one group must take into account its position vis-a-vis the others." 95 S.
Ct. at 2216. The dissent argued that the manner in which the standing issue was framed
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In trying to ascertain who can sue and under what circumstances in
the wake of Warth, it becomes apparent that the Court, in the name of
procedure, has severely restricted the substantive claims that will be
heard on the merits to the point of virtually removing economic exclu-
sionary zoning litigation from the federal courts.51 One need merely
look at the possible injuries in fact that would satisfy Warth's standing
test to see the validity of this assertion. (1) Persons living outside the
muncipality may sue on grounds of unlawful exclusion,"2 so long as they
demonstrate an interest in a particular project. However, this means
that they must find a project, which in turn requires a developer willing
to tie up his money in a project that contravenes the zoning for the
amount of time needed -to exhaust administrative remedies before an
intransigent municipal government and then proceed with litigation.
Time costs money in development, and the amount of time involved in
such a situation is likely to make development prohibitive. (2) Those
living within the municipality can challenge the administration of the
ordinance in a particular instance, alleging as their injury the depriva-
tion of the benefits of an economically mixed community.53 But again,
this will require a project and a developer. (3) The developer or his
association can challenge a particular application of the ordinance as
being arbitrary, once administrative remedies are exhausted.54 But
again, there must be a development-presumably planned, financed,
subsidized, and ready for construction except for the zoning problem-
in order for there to be a real injury.
These are the only direct, personal "injuries in fact" that can exist
under Warth. Any plaintiff failing to allege such an instance of exclu-
sion will lack standing to sue. Justice Brennan notes -the absurdity of
this position:
ignored the realities of the case, "that the low-income-minority plaintiff's interest is not
to live in a particular project but to live somewhere in the town in a dwelling they (sic)
can afford." Id. at 2217. However true this may be, the context in which the dissent
moved to get from this argument to the conclusion that standing existed is nothing less
than the "zone of interest" test that these same dissenters favored abolishing in
Richardson. This reasoning ignores the philosophy underlying the recent trend of
standing decisions, and mirrors the majority opinion in attempting to reach a final result
without paying enough attention to how it gets there.
51. See id. at 2216,2221.
52. The bases of suit would be equal protection and possibly the right to travel. See
generally WILLIAMS, supra note 37.
53. This is the Trailicante argument discussed in note 14 supra. It is based on
arbitrariness under due process (fourteenth amendment).
54. Depending upon the project, claims would be based on either equal protection
or due process grounds.
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In effect, the Court tells the low-income-minority and building
company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove what they
have alleged-that they could and would build and live in the
town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and its appli-
cation-because they have not succeeded in breaching, before the
suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject of the suit.55
In Heller's words, "there was only one catch, and that was Catch-22." 5
The Court's restriction of future suits to these three types of fact
situations-all of which require a wealthy developer willing to tie up his
money for a considerable length of time-will have the practical result
of keeping further economic exclusionary zoning litigation out of federal
court. Arguably, this is what the Court intended to do. A decision in
a zoning context based solely on a right of economic equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment would open to challenge on constitu-
tional grounds zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants nation-wide.
This is not to say that the Court has determined that there is no such
right, but merely that the Court has substantially reduced the chances of
hearing such a case. In a zoning context, the result of the restrictive
definition in Warth will be to channel all cases involving zoning back
into state courts. Here plaintiffs can challenge local ordinances under
the state enabling acts and avoid the federal standing test. That this is
-the signficance of Warth is indicated in the first (and so far only) case
to apply it, Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City
of Petaluma,7 in which the Ninth Circuit, relying heavily on Warth,
denied standing in an exclusionary zoning context on the ground that
plaintiffs -had not themselves been unlawfully excluded from the city,
and hence were arguing the rights of third parties.58
CONCLUSION
The Court in Warth recognized the plurality position in Richard-
son by adopting a single test for standing in federal courts, but then
proceeded to define that simple test so as to preclude most plaintiffs and
their substantive claims, at least within an exclusionary zoning context.
55. 95 S. Ct. at 2217.
56. J. HELLER, supra note 1, at 47.
57. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), noted in 54 N.C.L. REv. 266 (1976).
58. The court of appeals' terminology is confusing, in that the opinion is predicated
on Warth but uses the language "zone of interest." Arguably, this confusion arises from
the court's failure to understand that Warth changes the definition of injury. In any
event, the rationale used by the court is firmly grounded in Warth, even if the language
is not.
1976] STANDING 459
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The dissent's view that the Court treated the substantive area with
hostility seems justified.59 Whether future opinions will attempt to limit
the "injury in fact" construction of Warth to exclusionary zoning cases is
conjectural, though it is likely in light of the trend of cases prior to
Warth and the peculiarly volatile consequences of applying this trend in
a zoning context. The impact of Warth on zoning litigation is not likely
to be severe. State courts are becoming increasingly receptive to prob-
lems of economic exclusion, and arguably every plaintiff that has litigat-
ed this issue in the federal courts to date would have found a more
favorable forum in state court. Warth may have a larger impact in the
area of equal protection, given the constraints it places on bringing cases
in federal court that raise this issue in an economic context.
It might be noted that Warth was the wrong case to appeal if the
goal were to establish an economic equal protection doctrine. There
should have been a history of repeated project denials and plaintiffs who
would have been able to live in the projects had they been built. 0 The
consequences of bringing Warth before the Court are a number of
restrictive precedents in both standing law and the use of the equal
protection doctrine that if followed will have an adverse impact on
creative developments in both these areas. Unfortunately, given the
context of Warth in the series of standing decisions and the restrictions it
imposes on future zoning cases, it is not at all certain that the Court will
reassess its .holding in the near future.
WILLIAM W. DREYFOOS
Constitutional Law-The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine
From 1972 to 1974, the conclusive presumption doctrine' surfaced
as a viable vehicle for Supreme Court invalidation of legislation. The
doctrine requires nearly perfect conformity between the results of the
59. 95 S. Ct. at 2216.
60. See the Court's discussion. Id. at2209 n.16.
1. "Conclusive presumption" will be used interchangeably with "irrebuttable pres-
umption." See Simson, The Conclusive Presumption Cases: The Search for a Newer
Equal Protection Continues, 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 217, 220 (1975), where the internal
inconsistency of the terminology is described.
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means used and the legislative ends intended to be attained.2 Its use
has generated concern both on and off the Court due to its capacity,
when applied, to strike down almost any legislative classification, a
concern reminiscent of the fears generated by the old substantive due
process decisions.3 In Weinberger v. Salfi4 the Court declined to apply
conclusive presumption analysis5 and called on another line of cases
utilizing a "mere rational relationship" test to validate subsections
216(c)(5) and (e)(2) of the Social Security Act (Act).6
Plaintiffs Salfi and her daughter applied for Social Security insur-
ance benefits upon the death of Salfi's husband of nearly six months, a
wage earner covered by the Act.7 The definitions of "widow" and "child"
in subsections 216(c) (5) and (e) (2) deny benefits, in the absence of
other enumerated factors, to surviving wives and stepchildren whose
legal relationships to the wage earner were in existence for less than nine
months." After being denied benefits initially and on reconsideration,
plaintiffs brought suit in district court challenging the constitutionality
of the classifications. The district court applied conclusive presumption
analysis and found for the plaintiffs.9 On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed. 10 The high Court first rejected conclusive presumption analy-
sis and decided that only one constitutional claim was available to the
Salfi plaintiffs." The Court held that the plaintiffs' only assertable
claim was that the eligibility requirement was "not so rationally related
to a legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to deprive them of
benefits available to those who do satisfy that test."' 2  The majority,
however, concluded that the duration-of-relationship requirement is a
rationally based prophylactic rule, insulating the system from abuse.
13
2. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L Rav. 1534, 1534-36 (1974); text accompanying notes 17 and 42 infra.
3. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463-69 (1973) (Rehnquist, Burger, and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Simson, supra note 1, at 226-27. The doctrine is strongly
criticized in Note, 87 HARV. L. REv, supra note 2. One problem is that any statute can
be rephrased as an irrebuttable presumption. Simson, supra note 1, at 225-26; Note, 87
HARv. L. REv., supra note 2, at 1549.
4. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
5. Id. at 771-73. The Court analyzed a jurisdictional issue at length before
reaching the merits. Id. at 756-67.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c) (5), (e)(2) (1970).
7. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 963 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
8. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c), (e) (1970).
9. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
10. 422 U.S. at 785.
11. Id. at 771-72.
12. Id. at 772.
13. Id. at 777.
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An understanding of Salfi is aided by an examination of other
Supreme Court decisions that have applied or rejected conclusive pre-
sumption analysis. In Salfi, the majority distinguished three conclusive
presumption cases that the district court had relied upon." In the first
of those cases, Stanley v. Illinois,'" the State denied unwed fathers a
hearing on fitness to raise their children while allowing all other parents
a hearing when their custody was challenged. 16 The Court found that
the statutory scheme constituted an irrebuttable presumption that unwed
fathers are unfit to raise their children and declared it unconstitutional."7
The presumption was held unconstitutional because the legislative pre-
sumption that all unwed fathers are unfit parents was unreasonable.1 8
The embryonic irrebuttable presumption analysis of Stanley took
on additional form in Vlandis v. Kline." In Vlandis the Supreme
Court held that
[S]ince Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in al-
locating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is
forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resi-
dent rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presump-
tion of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or
universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alterna-
tive means of making the crucial determination.20
The invalidated statute2' had conclusively presumed that married stu-
dents were not bona fide residents if they were living outside of the state
at the time of application and that single students were not bona fide
residents if they had lived outside of the state at any time during the
previous year. 2
The third case relied upon by the district court, Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,13 represents the culmination of the major irre-
buttable presumption cases. The challenged rule in LaFleur required a
pregnant school teacher to quit her job and to go on leave without pay
five months before the anticipated birth.24 The school board claimed
14. Id. at 771-72.
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. Id. at 649-50.
17. Id. at 656-59.
18. Id. at 654-59.
19. 412U.S. 441 (1973).
20. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
21. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1975).
22. 412 U.S. at 442-43.
23. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
24. Id. at 634. The regulations further stated that, "A teacher on maternity leave
is not allowed to return to work until the beginning of the next regular school semester
which follows the date when her child attains the age of three months." Id. at 634-35.
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that one of the purposes of the rule was to keep unfit teachers out of the
classroom.2 5 The Court invoked the conclusive presumption doctrine to
invalidate the rule since the presumption that teachers within five
months of childbirth are physically unfit is "not necessarily or universal-
ly true."'26
Another Supreme Court case mentioned in Salfi was United States
Department of Agriculture v. Murry.17 Murry applied conclusive pre-
sumption analysis to invalidate a provision of the Food Stamp Act that
was designed to prevent non-needy households from abusing the sys-
tem. 8 The statute prohibited issuance of food stamps to households
that included a person claimed as a tax dependent by a non-needy
household.29 Although not specifically reciting the "universally true"
test, the Court did cite Vlandis and Stanley30 in finding the statute
unconstitutional because of its presumption that the households affected
by the statute were in fact non-needy." ' Oddly, in Salfi, the Supreme
Court cites Murry as authority for the proposition that "Congress may
not invidiously discriminate among . . . claimants . . . on the basis of
criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal."32
The Salfi majority's interpretation of Murry as a "rational relation" case,
rather than a conclusive presumption case, made it unnecessary to
distinguish the Court's application of the more stringent standard in
Murry.
The conclusive presumption approach had also been specifically
rejected in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Salfi. In Mourning
v. Family Publications Service, Inc.33 a regulation promulgated under
the Truth in Lending Act was challenged as an unconsitutional conclu-
sive presumption. The regulation made the disclosure requirements of
the act applicable whenever a loan was to be repaid in more than four
installments.34 Since the act requires disclosures by those who extend
credit to consumers and impose a charge for financing,35 the regulation
25. Id. at 641. The other purpose was to maintain continuity of classroom
instruction. The Court concluded that the rules had "no rational relationship to [that]
valid state interest." Id. at 643.
26. Id. at 646.
27. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
28. Id. at511-14.
29. Food Stamp Act of 1964, § 5(b), 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970). The tax
dependent had to be eighteen years of age for the statute to apply.
30. 413 U.S. at 513-14.
31. Id. at 511, 514.
32. 422 U.S. at 772.
33. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
34. Id. at 362; 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1975).
35. 411 U.S. at 361; Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970).
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was attacked as creating an irrebuttable presumption that credit pay-
ments in more than four installments involve a finance charge.8 0 The
Court rejected this argument, saying:
The rule was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not pre-
sume that all creditors who are within its ambit assess finance
charges, but rather, imposes a disclosure requirement on all mem-
bers of a defined class in order to discourage evasion by a substan-
tial portion of that class.37
In Marshall v. United States"8 the Court, applying the rational
relationship test, upheld provisions of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1966 that excluded addicts with two or more felony convic-
tions from rehabilitative commitment in lieu of penal incarceration."
The dissenting justices thought that the rule amounted to a conclusive
presumption which was not necessarily true, that is, that multiple felony
offenders are less likely to be cured by treatment. 40
Another rejection of irrebuttable presumption analysis came in
Sosna v. Iowa,41 a case which, like Vlandis, involved a residency re-
quirement. The challenge in Sosna was to a statute that required the
petitioner in a divorce action to have resided in the state for a year prior
to commencing the proceedings.42 The Court held that a reasonable
durational residency requirement in this situation was permissible, citing
language from Vlandis.43 The Court drew a distinction between a
requirement which causes delay (Sosna) and one which causes total
deprivation (Vlandis)."
The Supreme Court decided Salfi against this backdrop of cases
that either applied or specifically rejected conclusive presumption analy-
sis, as well as a line of equal protection cases.45 Under conclusive
presumption analysis, the goal of the statute must be exactly the result
obtained by implementation of the means adopted. That is, the classifi-
36. 411U.S.at363.
37. Id. at 377.
38. 414U.S. 417 (1974).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f)(4) (1970).
40. Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred with Justice Marshall's dissent. 414
U.S. at 430.
41. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
42. Id.; IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.6 (Supp. 1975).
43. 419 U.S. at 409-10.
44. Id.
45. The Court has based its conclusive presumption reasoning on due process,
though the commentators have argued that it really is, or should be, a type of equal
protection analysis. See generally Simson, supra note 1; Note, 87 HAnv. L. REv., Supra
note 2, at 1546-48; Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
RFv. 449 (1975).
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cation that creates the alleged presumption must be neither overinclusive
nor underinclusive. Such exactness is virtually impossible to attain by
statutory classification; only individualized hearings, which are mandat-
ed when the Court decides that a statute is an unconstitutional irrebutta-
ble presumption, can theoretically attain such precision.46
The problem, then, in conclusive presumption cases is not that the
avowed purpose is illegitimate, but, rather, that the means employed to
reach that end are imperfect. The doctrine has been applied when
legislative means infringe important individual rights, and when. the
governmental interest advanced is, by comparison to those rights, insub-
stantial.4 7 The cost and administrative difficulty of individual hearings
is generally to be considered in assessing the weight of the governmental
interest, 48 but this consideration standing alone does not prevent appli-
cation of the fatal irrebuttable presumption analysis.49
In LaFleur and Stanley, the individuals' interests were very strong
(freedom of choice in family matters, and custody of children, respec-
tively) and the governmental interest sought to be advanced by classifi-
cation rather than individualized hearings was comparatively weak. In
Mourning (right to extend credit), Marshall (right to civil rehabilita-
tion), and Sosna (right to divorce), the individuals' interests were not as
significant. Furthermore, the statutes and regulations involved in the
latter cases merely infringed upon the individuals' interests rather than
depriving them of their rights. As a result, the conclusive presumption
doctrine was not applied.
The statute in Salfi can be read as constituting an irrebuttable
presumption that those widows who married wage earners within nine
months of their decease married to obtain Social Security benefits rather
than to enjoy the "traditional benefits of marriage.""0  Moreover, the
statute completely deprives the individual of the right to receive bene-
46. A possible exception to the requirement of extreme precision is found in
Murry, 413 U.S. at 514, where the Court found the presumption to be "often contrary to
fact."
47. Id. at 518 (Marshall, J., concurring); text following note 49 infra. This is not
unlike Marshall's "sliding scale" analysis which he has articulated in a number of
concurring and dissenting opinions. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973). See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at 458-59
(White, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Salfi v. Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 781-82; Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. at
451.
49. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 646; Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. at 451; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
50. 373 F. Supp. at 965.
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fits.5 ' Nevertheless, the Court felt that irrebuttable presumption analy-
sis was inappropriate because the only right the plaintiffs claimed was a
right to non-contractual social welfare benefits.r2 The Salfi majority, by
categorizing Murry as a "rational relation" case could ignore the fact
that that case applied conclusive presumption analysis to a type of social
welfare. 5 ' Instead, the Court relied on Dandridge v. Williams, 14 a case
applying a rational relationship test to validate social welfare legisla-
tion which set a maximum limit on welfare grants regardless of the
size of the family receiving the benefits.55
The individuals' rights affected in Salfi were not substantial enough
to trigger conclusive presumption analysis.5 Nevertheless, the statute
could still have been invalidated under the rational relation test as
applied. Salfi did not follow the extremely deferential approach of
Dandridge.5 7  The approach taken was similar to that of Jiminez v.
Weinberger,5 another social welfare case, in which, although the Court
claimed to apply a "mere rationality" test,5" the statute fell. The
judicial scrutiny in Jiminez and Salfi apparently involved what the
commentators have termed "rationality with bite."00  Dandridge was
distinguished in Jiminez because the governmental interest in Dandridge
was much stronger; a finding of unconstitutionality would have threat-
ened the entire program-" In Jiminez, not only was the governmental
interest less compelling, it was apparent that the critical determination
51. Id.
52. 422 U.S. at 771-72.
53. See text accompanying and following note 32 supra.
54. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
55. 422 U.S. at 769-70.
56. Id. at 771-72. This insubstantiality was accentuated by comparison with the
magnitude of the difficulty of administering individual hearings. See id. at 781-82 & n.13.
57. The depth of the analysis the Court applied in Salfi was reflected, perhaps, by
the verbalized requirement that the statute be "so rationally related .... " (emphasis
added). Id. at 772. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
58. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
59. Id. at 632. The challenged statute denied Social Security benefits to illegiti-
mate children born after the wage earner became disabled unless they could inherit under
state law or were legitimized or were illegitimate only because of some formal defect in
their parents' marriage. The Court said the law was unconstitutional if "the classifica-
tion [was] justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." The Court
did recognize a legitimate governmental interest, but did not defer to legislative discretion
in effectuating that interest. Rather, the majority found no reasonable relation between
the classification and its purpose. Id. at 636.
60. The premier article concerning intermediate scrutiny is Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). In connection with Gunther's article, see Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), a recent example of "rationality with bite."
61. 417 U.S. at 633.
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could have been made more accurately by individualized hearings than
by the statutory scheme. 2 In contrast, the Salfi plaintiffs failed to show
that individualized hearings or any rule other than the nine month
requirement could more effectively filter out sham marriages.6 3
The weakest part of the Salfi opinion is the distinguishing of
Vlandis on the grounds that "the Social Security Act does not purport to
speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage, but then
make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissable." 64  On
the contrary, that would seem to be precisely the Act's effect. The
Court even states that the purpose of the nine month requirement as
revealed in the legislative history is to insulate the system from those
who marry with the intent to defraud the Social Security system.6 5
Whether or not the Act literally speaks of the bona fides of the parties
should not matter; in fact, the statute in Vlandis did not refer, literally,
to the bona fides of the party claiming residency.60
The only logical interpretation of the language quoted above is that
the Act is concerned with the bona fides of the parties and that "plainly
relevant" evidence means "objective" evidence. Thus, the basis for
sustaining the Vlandis challenge, but not the Salfi challenge, should
have been the existence of objective evidence bearing on the bona fides
of the parties in Vlandis, and the Court would have adequately ex-
plained the different results. The correctness of the result in Vlandis
does not explain the application of conclusive presumption analysis in
that case. The Court should have admitted that unless the challenged
statute in Vlandis is viewed as infringing the right to travel, which it was
not,67 the individual interest was not sufficient to invoke the conclusive
presumption doctrine. Arguably, the Supreme Court ought to have
accorded Vlandis the same level of scrutiny as Salfi and Jiminez, as all
three cases involved a type of non-contractual public benefit, (Social
Security in Salfi and Jiminez, reduced tuition in Vlandis). The statute
in Vlandis could still have been declared unconstitutional under the
62. The critical determination was whether or not the child was, in fact, dependent.
A hearing on dependency would be less likely to exclude dependents or include non-
dependents than the challenged statute. Id. at 634-38.
63. 422 U.S. at 782-84. See especially id. n.15.
64. Id. at 772. Justice Rehnquist probably meant: The Social Security Act does
not (1) purport to speak in terms of the bona fides of the parties to a marriage and (2)
then make plainly relevant evidence of such bona fides inadmissable. See also id. at
803 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 777-80. Accord, 373 F. Supp. at 965.
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329(b) (Supp. 1975).
67. If the right to travel was in the contemplation of the Court, they did not
express it. 412 U.S. 441.
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rational relation test because objective criteria existed that could have
been easily utilized to make a more accurate determination of residen-
cy 68
Thus the meaning of Salfi is twofold. First, in the area of Social
Security, the individual interest affected, even when there is a total
deprivation of benefits, will be insufficient to trigger conclusive pre-
sumption analysis. This will be particularly true when the rule has a
prophylactic effect, insulating the system from substantial abuse, since
the governmental interest will be correspondingly great. Secondly, the
Court may find a given classification to be rationally related to the
legislative goal in spite of a fairly close examination of the statute. The
factor crucial to such a finding is the unavailability of other methods
that would clearly yield a more accurate result. Other means were not
proven to be available in Salfi; the statute was therefore validated as a
legitimate exercise of legislative discretion. To deprive Congress of the
power to enact statutes, albeit admittedly imperfect, to protect public
welfare systems from abuse when other effective means are unavailable
would be, indeed, to quote from an earlier opinion of Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, "an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself.""0
WILLIAM H. HIGGINS
Constitutional Law-The First Amendment Status of Commer-
cial Advertising
In the 1942 case of Valentine v. Chrestensen,1 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the Constitution does not prohibit regulation
of "purely commercial advertising."' Although the statement was not
the basis for the Court's decision in that case, it spawned the widely
accepted doctrine3 that "commercial speech" is not protected by the first
68. Such criteria included voter registration, driver's license, car registration, prop-
erty ownership, place of filing tax returns, and year-round homes. Id. at 448.
69. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 660 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
2. Id. at 54.
3. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 384-85 (1973); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (dissent); Breard v.
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amendment. A broad exception to this "commercial speech" doctrine
developed over the years which gave first amendment protection to
commercial speech if the commercial aspect of the speech was subordi-
nate to a "primary purpose" of religious freedom or political advoca-
vy.4  In Bigelow v. Virginia' the Supreme Court disposed of the
"commercial speech" doctrine completely without overruling Valentine
and then applied a standard that gives commercial speech first amend-
ment protection if it contains "factual material of clear public interest."6
In Bigelow the advertisement in question, which previously would have
been denied first amendment protection on the ground that it was
"commercial speech," was afforded first amendment protection on the
basis of its informational content. This result seems to indicate a
greater willingness on the part of the Court to give first amendment
protection to advertisements. The Court, however, shied away from
holding that commercial speech per se is protected by the first amend-
ment and thus evidenced a further desire to subject advertising's potent
message-selling powers to some degree of local governmental regula-
tion.7
Appellant Bigelow was the managing editor of The Virginia Week-
ly, a newspaper that is published and circulated in Virginia.8  The
Virginia Weekly published a New York-based abortion-referral agency's
advertisement which stated that abortions were legal in New York, that
there were no residency requirements for abortion patients and that
immediate placements in accredited hospitals would be made with full
confidentiality for those who called the New York telephone numbers
listed.0 Bigelow was convicted by the County Court of Albemarle
City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417
(1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 597 (1942); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205, 211 (4th Cir. 1972); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582,
584 (D.D.C. 1971); Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va.
1969) (three-judge court); Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz.
231, 240, 375 P.2d 719, 725 (1962); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11
N.J. 144, 152, 93 A.2d 362, 366 (1952).
4. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943).
5. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
6. Id. at 822.
7. For a discussion of the problems of advertising, see Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
8. The Virginia Weekly is published by the Virginia Weekly Associates of
Charlottesville. The appellant was convicted because he was the responsible officer of
thepaper. 421 U.S. at 811.
9. The advertisement in full ran as follows:
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County for publishing the abortion-referral advertisement under section
18.1-63 of the Virginia Code Annotated which at that time provided1°
that anyone who encouraged or prompted the procural of abortion by
publication, advertisement or "in any other manner" would be guilty of
a misdemeanor.1 He was afforded a trial de novo in the Circuit Court,
wherein he was again convicted and also fined. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed. 2 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States vacated the holding and remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of the recently decided abortion cases of Roe v. Wade 3 and
Doe v. Bolton.'4  On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court again af-
firmed 5 and the case went back to the United States Supreme Court on
appeal. The Supreme Court finally reversed Bigelow's conviction 0 on
the ground that the advertisement contained "factual material of clear
... public interest' 7 and thus was protected by the first amendment.
The rationale of the Bigelow decision is best understood in light of
the line of cases out of which it grew. In Valentine v. Chrestensen the
"UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN
ACCREDITED HOSPITALS AND
CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call anytime
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We
will make all arrangements for you
and help you with information and
counselling."
Id. at 812.
10. The statute was amended by ch. 725, [1972] Va. Acts. In its opinion, the
United States Supreme Court said that "the amended statute would not reach appellant's
advertisement." 421 U.S. 813 n.3. Therefore, the constitutionality of the statute was
not at issue in Bigelow.
11. The statute before amendment read:
"If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation
of any publication, or in any other manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of
abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63
(1950).
12. 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972). For a discussion of the opinion, see
Recent Developments, The First Amendment and Commercial Advertising: Bigelow v.
Commonwealth, 60 VA. L REv. 154 (1974).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
15. 214 Va. 341,200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
16. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Justices Rehnquist and White dissented).
17. Id. at 822.
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appellant had attempted to distribute a handbill advertisement in viola-
tion of a section of the New York City Sanitary Code which forbade the
distribution of advertisements on public streets. Upon being told by the
Police Commissioner that he could only lawfully distribute handbills
devoted to "information or a public protest,"' 8 Chrestensen appended a
"civic appeal" to the handbill, solely "with the intent, and for the
purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance."'' Because of
Chrestensen's attempt to evade the handbill law, the Court refused to
consider his first amendment claim. Therefore the Court never reached
the issue whether commercial speech is protected by the first amend-
ment. In its opinion the Court acknowledged that the first amendment
prohibits legislatures from unduly burdening the right of free speech but
followed by saying: "We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing."12 0 This statement eventually came to be known as the "commer-
cial speech" doctrine and has often been cited as authority for the
contention that commercial speech does not fall within the protective
embrace of the first amendment. 2'
A series of cases followed Valentine which involved speech that
combined either commercial and religious aspects or commercial and
political aspects. In deciding these cases, the Court looked to see which
aspect was "primary." Most notable among these cases were the
religious handbill cases, in which a religious organization engaged in
door-to-door distribution of advertisements for religious meetings,'22 sold
religious books and pamphlets for a nominal sum"3 or distributed
circulars which invited people to buy religious books or contribute to the
religious organization. '  Similar were the political advocacy cases, in
which a labor union leader advocated the union's cause to a mass of
workers and then solicited new members 2 or a political-organization
lawyer solicited clients to test issues in the courts. 2a The Supreme Court
held that the speech in these cases fell outside of the "commercial
speech" doctrine and inside the protection of the first amendment
because the "primary purpose" of the speech was either religious or
18. 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942).
19. Id. at 55.
20. Id. at 54.
21. Cases cited note 3 supra.
22. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
23. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
24. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
25. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
26. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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political and the commercial aspect was merely incidental to that pur-
pose. The implication of this "primary purpose" test was that speech
that did have commerce as its "primary purpose" would fall squarely
within the Valentine label of "purely commercial advertising" and there-
fore outside the protections afforded by the first amendment.
The Court turned away from the "primary purpose" test in the
1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.27 The respondent in
that case claimed that a paid political advertisement in The New York
Times was libelous and sued The Times for printing it. The Times
claimed that it had a first amendment privilege to accept and print the
advertisement. Although the advertisement clearly had political advo-
cacy as its primary purpose and therefore would have received first
amendment protection under the "primary purpose" test, the Court no
longer looked to the "primary purpose" of the advertisement. Rather,
the Court shifted its focus to the informational content of the advertise-
ment and found that it "communicated information, expressed opinion,
recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial sup-
port on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters
of the highest public interest and concern. Purely on the basis of the
content of the advertisement, the Court found it to be deserving of first
amendment protection.
The Supreme Court contrasted Sullivan to Valentine in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Rights. 20  In that case
the Court was presented with the question whether the first amend-
ment gives a newspaper editor the right to publish advertisements in sex-
designated columns in contravention of a local ordinance. Sullivan was
distinguished from Valentine on the ground that the Valentine advertise-
ment did no more than propose a commercial transaction, whereas the
Sullivan advertisement communicated information as well.30 The Court
in Pittsburgh Press ultimately found that the advertisements in question
merely proposed commercial transactions and were therefore within the
"commercial speech" exception to the first amendment proscription.'
The "commercial speech" doctrine was not without critics during
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28. Id. at 266.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
30. Id. at 385.
31. Id. It is important to note, however, that an uncontested ordinance in
Pittsburgh Press made discrimination in employment illegal. Since the Court reasoned
that it would violate public policy to allow advertising of illegal commercial activities, it
is questionable whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion if an illegal
activity had not been involved. ld. at 388.
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this period. Three Justices dissented from the holding of Pittsburgh
Press.32 Furthermore, in his concurring opinion in Cammarano v. United
States,3 3 Justice Douglas discussed the state of the "commercial speech"
doctrine: "The [Valentine] ruling was casual, almost offhand. And it
has not survived reflection." '34 "The extent to which such advertising
could be regulated consistently with the First Amendment . . . has
* * . never been authoritatively determined."35 Thus, the "commercial
speech" doctrine was overripe for review when Bigelow v. Virginia was
appealed to the Supreme Court.
In Bigelow the Supreme Court reevaluated both Valentine and the
"commercial speech" doctrine. First, the Court limited the holding of
Valentine to apply only to the "manner in which commercial advertising
could be distributed" 36 and not to commercial advertising per se. Thus,
according to the Bigelow Court, Valentine holds that the means of
distributing advertising may be regulated, but does not speak to the
issue of whether commercial advertising itself may be regulated. There-
fore, Valentine is not authority for the "commercial speech" doctrine.
The Court then expressly rejected the "commercial speech" doctrine in
favor of the more modem approach adopted in Sullivan and Pittsburgh
Press: commercial speech "is not stripped of first amendment protection
merely because it appears in that form."' 7
The real questions presented in Bigelow, however, were how much
protection the first amendment affords commercial speech and under
what conditions. To answer those questions, the Court developed a
content test to be applied on a case-by-case basis to commercial adver-
tisements. If the advertisement in question contains "factual material of
clear public interest"3 it will be afforded first amendment protection.
This test was implicit in Sullivan, which protected the advertisement
there in question because it contained "matters of the highest public
interest and concern. 39  In Bigelow the Court adopted the Sullivan
standard as part of its informational content test.
This abstract informational content test acquired concrete meaning
32. In separate dissents, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice Stewart
rejected the "commercial speech" doctrine and disapproved of the majority's decision as
an unwarranted extension of that doctrine. Id. at 393, 397, 400.
33. 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
34. Id. at 514.35. Id. at 513 n.*.
36. 421 U.S. at 819.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 822.
39. 376 U.S. at 266.
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when the Court applied it to the Bigelow advertisement. In applying
the test, the Court "[v]iewed [the advertisement] in its entirety"40 and
found that it "conveyed information of potential interest and value to a
diverse audience ... ." The Court particularly stressed the first two
lines of the advertisement: "Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements." Also, the Court pointed out that
the mere existence of abortion-referral agencies is a matter of public
interest, as are abortions themselves.42 Thus, the Court was willing to
look, not only to the content of the body of the advertisement, but also
to the subjects of public interest suggested by the advertisement.
Furthermore, the Bigelow advertisement lacked one important
characteristic that was previously essential to a finding that an advertise-
ment was protected by the first amendment: it did not contain an
expression of religious freedom or any political grievance or advocacy. 41
Rather, the Bigelow advertisement had as its "primary purpose" the
solicitation of a commercial transaction and any information "of public
interest" contained in the advertisement was merely incidental to that
purpose. By giving first amendment protection to the Bigelow adver-
tisement, the Court indicated that application of the informational con-
tent test will result in giving commercial advertisements much more first
amendment protection than has been true in the past.
By subjecting commercial advertising to a content test, however,
the Supreme Court preserved the historical distinction between commer-
cial and other forms of speech. Bigelow requires that commercial
speech be scrutinized with regard to content, whereas, with respect to
other forms of speech, the Court "has always refused to distinguish for
first amendment purposes on the basis of content. '44 This inquiry into
the content of advertising leaves a big governmental foot in the door of
first amendment protection of advertising. Although the courts may no
longer reject a first amendment claim out of hand because an advertise-
ment is the subject of the claim, they are still free to reject the claim on a
case-by-case basis by finding that the content of the advertisement in
question does not meet the Bigelow test.
40. 95 S. Ct. at 822.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
44. 421 U.S. at 831 (dissent). Of course, there are exceptional cases in which
the Court will consider content: if the content of the speech is found to be obscene
(Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957)), libelous (Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)), or "fighting" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)), then it is stripped of first amendment protection. Normally, however,
content has no relevance to the question of whether speech is protected.
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Furthermore, the protection afforded an advertisement that meets
the Bigelow content test is not absolute. The Court applied a balancing
test to the competing interests at stake in Bigelow. When, as in
Bigelow, the interest of an individual or a group of individuals conflicts
with a state interest, the Court must balance the respective interests
against each other to determine which will take precedence. When first
amendment interests are involved, the Court has traditionally accorded
them great weight in this balancing process.45 When the private interest
is in the realm of commerce, however, the Court has traditionally given
that interest less weight, with the result that state regulation of commer-
cial activity has been upheld far more readily than state regulation of
first amendment interests. Since the Court gave the Bigelow advertise-
ment first amendment protection, it would appear that advertising is
now weighted equally with other forms of speech protected by the first
amendment. The Court, however, was not at all clear on the issue.
Rather than emphasizing the importance of the first amendment interest
involved, the Court denigrated the state interest: "Virginia [was] really
asserting an interest in regulating what Virginians may hear or read
about the New York Services. . . . This asserted interest . . . was
entitled to little, if any weight under the circumstances."46  There is
reason to believe that the Bigelow Court did not value the interests of
advertising as highly as it has valued other first amendment interests.
The Bigelow Court sanctioned the result of Valentine, wherein the state
interest prevailed over the interests of advertising. The Valentine ordi-
nance, prohibiting distribution of commercial handbills in the public
streets, was found to be "a reasonable regulation" of advertising. 47
Similar ordinances pertaining to non-commercial handbills have not
been sanctioned by the Court. For example, Schneider v. State48
involved a similar ordinance which forbade the distribution, not just of
commercial handbills, but of all handbills, in the public streets. In that
case, the Court found that such a prohibition restrained free speech and
therefore was an entirely unreasonable regulation. Likewise, an ordi-
nance forbidding the distribution of anonymous handbills in the public
streets was struck down as an unlawful restraint on free speech in Talley
v. California.49 The balancing standard applied to conmnercial adver-
45. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448 (1963) (dissent); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 527 n.12 (1945).
46. 421 U.S. at 828.
47. Id. at 819.
48. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
49. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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tisements in Valentine and accepted by the Court in Bigelow is clearly
less stringent than that applied in Schneider and Talley, when non-
commercial speech was involved.
It remains to be seen what types of advertising will be subject to
governmental regulation after Bigelow. Of course, any advertisement
that does not meet the requirement of the threshold informational
content test may be regulated. Assuming, however, that the threshold is
met, it will be important to know what types of advertising will balance
unfavorably against the state's interest, resulting in state regulation of
speech. The Bigelow Court indicated its approval of regulation of
advertising in the areas of electronic media communication 0 and profes-
sional activities, 51 and it described another area in which it thought there
"existed a clear relationship between the advertising in question and an
activity that the government was legitimately regulating."5 2  In this
area, advertising which violated United States Postal Regulations,"
racially discriminatory advertising54 and advertising which violated anti-
block-busting laws55 were prohibited. The Court further implied that
regulation of deceptive or fraudulent advertising, advertising of illegal
activities and advertising aimed at a captive audience will be subject to
regulation. 56
Bigelow's most important contribution to the constitutional prob-
lem of commercial advertising is its rejection of the "commercial
speech" doctrine. Courts may no longer deny first amendment protec-
tion to advertisements merely because they are commercial in character.
Instead, the courts must undergo a two-step process with respect to each
advertisement brought before them: first, the courts must test the con-
tent of the advertisement to determine whether it contains "factual
material of clear public interest." Secondly, if the advertisement passes
this content test, then the courts must balance the competing interests
involved before granting or denying first amendment protection. The
50. Electronic media is an area in which advertisements have been greatly regulat-
ed. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973).
51. Particularly in the field of medical health, the Court has often held that the
state may regulate advertising. E.g., Head v. New Mexico Board, 374 U.S. 424 (1963):
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
52. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.
53. Rockville Reminder, Inc. v. United States Potal Serv., 480 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1973).
54. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
55. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934
(1972).
56. 421 U.S. at 828.
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Bigelow Court indicated, however, that the fulcrum used in balanc-
ing governmental interests against those of advertising will favor the
government so that most of the regulation of advertising which was
sanctioned before Bigelow will remain intact. If this proves true in the
courts' post-Bigelow case-by-case considerations of advertisements, then
the first amendment status of advertising will not be any higher after
Bigelow than it was before. It appears that the rule allowing govern-
mental regulation of advertising will remain in force and that advertise-
ments receiving first amendment protection, such as the one involved in
Bigelow, will remain the exception to the rule.
HELEN L. WINSLOW
Criminal Law-Testing the Credibility of Search Warrant Affi-
davits
Relying upon the fourth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution', criminal defendants often attempt to suppress evidence being
offered against them by attacking the validity of the search warrant used
to obtain the evidence.' One method of challenging the warrant's
validity is by attacking the affidavit upon which its issuance was based.3
1. State court defendants actually rely on the fourth amendment as incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). References to the fourth amendment in this note are made
with this incorporation in mind.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
The United States Supreme Court has held that most searches may be made only
with a search warrant, the situation involved in this note. Warrantless searches have
been permitted only when officers come across evidence in "plain view," as in Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam); when the search is consented to;
where there are exigent circumstances, such as the possibility that evidence will be
destroyed or moved, as in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); or subsequent
to lawful arrest, as in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
When a search has been made with a warrant, possible issues are whether there was
probable cause for the warrant, whether the warrant was issued in accord with statutory
requirements, and whether it was executed properly.
3. Former section 15-26(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes required that
"(a]n affidavit signed under oath or affirmation by the affiant or affiants and indicating
the basis for the finding of probable cause must be a part of or attached to the warrant,"
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In two 1975 cases, however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
imposed a limitation on the permissible scope of such attacks. In State
v. Harris4 and State v. Brannon' the court held that defendants may
question the sufficiency, but not the veracity, of the allegations in the
affidavit. While that position is one that has been established in some
states for years, it is one of questionable validity since the United States
Supreme Court's 1961 decision of Mapp v. Ohio,0 which made the
exclusionary rule a requirement of the fourth amendment.
The issue arose in Harris during a pretrial hearing on a motion to
suppress evidence obtained with a search warrant.7  An officer obtained
the warrant to search the defendants' apartment for evidence of illegal
drugs. The affidavit he submitted to obtain the warrant stated that an
"informer who in the past has proven reliable by giving this detective
information that resulted in more than 2 arrests and convictions.. ,"
had told him that defendants had drugs in their possession.8 Defendants
attempted to question the officer about the two prior convictions. Ob-
jections to the questions were sustained, however.9
In Brannon defendant moved after trial to suppress evidence
gained from a search of his automobile. The evidence, a dog leash,10
had been obtained with a search warrant issued on the basis of a police
officer's affidavit statement that property used in the commission of a
crime had been located in defendant's automobile. The affidavit stated
that this allegation was based on "personal information" from a party
Law of June 19, 1969, ch. 869, § 8, [1969] N.C. Sess. Laws 975 (repealed 1973). New
statutes which went into effect July 1, 1975, contain a similar requirement. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-244 (1975).
4. 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 666, 216 S.E.2d
909 (1975).
5. 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 287 N.C.
665, 216 S.E.2d 908 (1975). This was the second time Brannon was before the court of
appeals. After the first trial of the case, the trial court held that the search warrant may
have been invalid, but said that the evidence could still be used at trial because it was
found in plain view and thus seizure was valid without a warrant. The court of appeals
ordered a new trial, however, holding that the trial court erred in failing to make
findings of fact showing that police officers were legally on the premises where the
evidence was found in plain view. State v. Brannon, 21 N.C. App. 464, 469, 204 S.E.2d
895, 899 (1974).
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 25 N.C. App. at 405, 213 S.E.2d at 415.
8. Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414. The Supreme
Court held in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), that an affiant relying on
information from an unnamed informant must state: (1) underlying circumstances
showing reason to believe the informant is credible and (2) underlying circumstances
showing the basis of conclusions reached by the informant.
9. 25 N.C. App. at 405,213 S.E.2d at 415.
10. The defendant was charged with larceny of a dog under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
84 (1969). Brief for Appellee at 1, 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213.
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who had seen the property in question." In support of his post-trial
motion to suppress, defendant argued that testimony at trial showed that
the party referred to in the affidavit had not positively identified the
leash before it was obtained under the warrant.' 2 Nevertheless, his
motion to suppress was denied.' 3
The appeals court affirmed both lower court rulings without con-
sidering the validity of the suspicions about each affiant's credibility. It
also did not distinguish between Harris, in which defendant sought
information to challenge the veracity of the affidavit, and Brannon, in
which defendant claimed that he had evidence raising a question about
the affiant's veracity. Instead, the court decided both cases by adopting
the "majority rule" that when the search warrant is valid on its face and
the sworn allegations are sufficient to establish probable cause, a de-
fendant may not attack the validity of the allegations or the credibility of
the affiant or his informant in the voir dire hearing on the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence seized by law enforcement officers.' 4
To explain its position the Harris court said:
[T]he magistrate considers and passes upon the alleged circum-
stances, the credibility of the informant and the credibility of the
affiant. The policy of the Fourth Amendment to protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately served by these
11. Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 635, 214 S.E.2d 213.
12. Id. at 26. The defendant in Brannon also contended that the evidence obtained
with the search warrant should be suppressed because the party's identification referred
to in that affidavit came while police were making an illegal search. Id. at 29. The
court of appeals also held that this argument was not a valid basis for challenging a
search warrant, repeating its position in Harris that if a search warrant is sufficient on
its face, the validity of the allegations in the underlying affidavit cannot be attacked. 25
N.C. App. at 636-37, 214 S.E.2d at 215. The court's holding on this point raises a
constitutional question similar to that in the bar against attacks on an affiant's credibili-
ty. If evidence gained unconstitutionally cannot be used at trial, it seems to follow that
it also cannot be used indirectly to secure a search warrant. In fact, the Supreme Court
has said that the exclusionary rule not only prohibits such evidence from being used at
trial, but also from being used in any way. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). Still, the issue apparently is one rarely faced by courts.
Generally, police who secure evidence unconstitutionally attempt to use it at trial, rather
than to secure a search warrant. No prior cases on the issue have been found.
13. 25 N.C. App. at 637, 214 S.E.2d at 215.
14. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416. The court added, however, that:
This rule of law should not be so broadly interpreted as to infer that under
no circumstances can a defendant attack the validity of a search warrant which
is valid on its face, or valid when the affidavit is adequately supported by a
sworn statement. For example, one ground for attacking its validity is that
the magistrate failed to properly perform a judicial function in finding probable
cause, as in State v. Miller, 16 N.C. App. 1, 190 S.E.2d 888 (1972), modified,
282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973), where the magistrate issued the search
warrant without reading it.
25 N.C. App. at 407, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
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standards. To permit a defendant to challenge the truth or accu-
racy of the factual averments of the affidavit, or the credibility of
the informant or affiant, would open at trial an issue or issues,
theretofore judicially determined, collateral to that of guilt or in-
nocence. 15
The logic for distinguishing between attacks on the sufficiency of
allegations and attacks on the veracity of the affidavit was not explained.
The court of appeals has indicated elsewhere, however, that the basis for
its distinction is that a judge can determine the sufficiency by studying
the affidavit, but the determination of credibility requires a hearing with
testimony. 16
Both cases were appealed, but the North Carolina Supreme Court
dismissed the appeals without comment.
The limitation on a motion to suppress was not clearly established
in North Carolina before Harris and Brannon. The court cited a 1973
case, Siate v. Salem,'7 as precedent. In that case, the court refused to
require a police officer to answer questions about allegations he made in
an affidavit when the affidavit was attacked on a motion to suppress."8
That case may have been precedent for Harris, but two post-Salem
cases, State v. Wooten"0 and State v. Logan,20 contained language
contrary to the holding in Brannon. In both previous cases, the court
had rejected claims by defendant that during a voir dire hearing on a
motion to suppress evidence gained by a search warrant, the State
should produce witnesses to show that probable cause existed for the
search. The court held that the affidavit used to apply for the search
15. 25 N.C. App. at 406,213 S.E.2d at 416.
16. The court indicated this justification in State v. Salem, 17 N.C. App. 269, 193
S.E.2d 755 (1973), in which it refused to require a police officer to answer questions
about allegations he made in an affidavit when the affidavit was attacked on a motion to
suppress. The court said: "The affidavit was before the court and a voir dire hearing
was not required in order for the court to find that the facts contained therein were
sufficient to meet constitutional and statutory requirements." Id. at 274, 193 S.E.2d at
758.
17. 17 N.C. App. 269, 193 S.E.2d 755 (1973).
18. Even Salem was dubious precedent. In that case, the defendant apparently was
not trying to impeach a specific statement the police officer had made in his affidavit,
but rather to attack the officer's conclusion that the informer was credible. If Salem was
not on point, neither was the case that the court cited as precedent: State v. Shirley, 12
N.C. App. 440, 183 S.E.2d 880, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 729, 184 S.E.2d 885 (1971). The
issue in that case was whether the affidavit gave the magistrate sufficient basis on which
to judge the credibility of the informer relied on by the officer, not whether the
statements in the affidavit were accurate.
19. 20 N.C. App. 139, 201 S.E.2d 89 (1973), cert. denied, 284 N.C. 623, 202
S.E.2d 277 (1974).
20. 18 N.C. App. 557, 197 S.E.2d 238 (1973).
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warrant was a "sufficient showing."' 21 But the court also said that the
defendant, if he wished, could produce evidence himself to attack the
credibility of the facts stated or the motives of the officer who executed
the affidavit.2 2 Also, in a 1971 case,23 the court considered the merit of
a defendant's claim that a search warrant was based on hearsay, without
simply dismissing the inquiry as irrelevant.
The position taken in Harris and Brannon is well established
outside North Carolina. As the court noted in Harris,2 4 the majority of
courts that have considered the question have held that defendants may
not attack the veracity of search warrant affidavits. 25 Nevertheless, the
North Carolina court's decision to subscribe to the rule at this time is
surprising. Most courts that have adopted the no-attack rule did so
before 1961, the year in which the United States Supreme Court decided
Mapp v. Ohio.2" In that case, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment not only included the fourth amendment's guarantee of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, but also mandated
state enforcement of the rule requiring exclusion from trial of evidence
that was obtained by methods violating the fourth amendment.2 7
While some courts have defended the no-attack rule since Mapp,28
21. 20 N.C. App. at 141, 201 S.E.2d at 90. For similar language in Logan, see 18
N.C. App. at 558, 197 S.E.2d at 239.
22. 20 N.C. App. at 141, 201 S.E.2d at 90; 18 N.C. App. at 558, 197 S.E.2d at 240.
23. State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App. 487, 183 S.E.2d 820, cert denied, 279 N.C. 885,
184 S.E.2d 885 (1971).
24. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
25. See 5 A.LR.2d 394 (1949, Supp. 1971) and 68 AM. JUR. Search & Seizure § 66
(1973) for annotations indicating that most courts considering this issue have subscribed
to the no-attack rule. Prior to the 1960s, it appears that about the only dissent to the
rule came from federal courts which based their holdings on an interpretation of federal
rules. See 5 A.L.R.2d, supra, at 407-09 (1949). Although the situation has changed
since 1961, as this note will discuss, the no-attack rule probably still commands a
majority since most states considering the issue did so before 1961.
26. 367U.S. 643 (1961).
27. The Court had decided in 1914 that federal courts should abide by the
exclusionary rule. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). And in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court had held that the fourteenth amendment
encompassed the "security of one's privacy ...which is at the core of the fourth
amendment." But the Court said then that the fourteenth and fourth amendments did
not require the state courts to enforce the exclusionary rule.
After Mapp, a 1963 case completed the implementation of the fourth amendment on
the state level. The Court held that the same standards of reasonableness and probable
cause governed both federal and state activities. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
28. They include Liberto v. State, 24 Ark. 350, 451 S.W.2d 464 (1970); State v.
Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, 309 A.2d 135 (1973); People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140,
258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888 (1970); State v. Lamp, 209 Kan. 453, 497
P.2d 275 (1972); State v. Anselmo, 260 La. 306, 256 So. 2d 98 (1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 911 (1972); Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111, cert. denied, 386 U.S.
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a significant number have argued that the Constitution requires review
of the credibility of affiants for the same reason the Supreme Court cited
in Mapp-to deter conduct that circumvents the fourth amendment.2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, held in favor of review
in 1970, because to hold otherwise "would permit the police in every
case to exaggerate or to expand on the facts given to the magistrate
merely for the purpose of meeting the probable cause requirement.""0
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, on the other hand, did not
mention Mapp in either of its decisions. In fact, in citing a 1949
annotation to support its argument in Harris, it indicated that it may not
have even fully considered it.'
Affiants who present erroneous information in applying for search
warrants clearly defeat the intention of the warrant requirement.32 The
fourth amendment states that warrants shall issue only upon probable
cause, and the Supreme Court has said that probable cause exists only
1024 (1966); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965).
29. They include McConnell v. State, 48 Ala. App. 523, 266 So. 2d 328, cert.
denied, 289 Ala. 746, 266 So. 2d 334 (1972); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211
N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965); Henderson v. State, 490 P.2d 786 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971); Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A.2d 441 (1970); and State
v. Hink, 6 Wash. App. 374, 492 P.2d 1053 (1972) on the state level and United States v.
Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979 (7th
Cir. 1972); and United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1002 (1970) on the federal level.
Other federal courts have allowed inquiry but have not made it clear whether they
were doing so on constitutional grounds or, as some did before Mapp, on an interpreta-
tion of the federal rules. See, e.g., United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d 322 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Botsch, 364 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1966).
The number of dissenters since 1961 is significant for two reasons. First, there
appear to be almost as many dissenters from as supporters of the majority rule. In
addition, before Mapp, there apparently was no dissent from the rule on constitutional
grounds.
30. Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 337, 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970).
31. The court cited 5 A.L.R.2d 394 (1949). 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at
416. It is also interesting to note that the court's reasoning was reminiscent of the
reasoning given by the courts before Mapp. One commentator, summing up the
reasoning of the no-attack cases, stated:
Their basic premise is that in issuing a warrant, the magistrate determines the
truth of the allegations. Holding this determination unreviewable supposedly
protects the solemnity of the warrant-issuing procedure; it has been contended
that a shift of final responsibility from the magistrate to the trial judge would
reduce the function of the magistrate to a formality. Moreover, it is argued
that an attack upon the truth of an affidavit at the trial may cause the issue
of the defendant's guilt to be confused with that of an affiant's perjury. It is
claimed that affiants will not lie because to do so would be perjury.
Note, Testing the Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1529, 1530
(1967).
32. The North Carolina court seemed to recognize this by its statement that
magistrates must review credibility. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 414.
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where "the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge, and
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information" present sufficient
justification.33 Thus, allegations going beyond such information do not
establish probable cause. 4
Other methods might be used to punish affiants who make false or
misleading allegations,35 but the Supreme Court recognized in Mapp
that the only effective, available way to deter conduct is to remove the
incentive for it by preventing it from resulting in prosecution.3" The
issue presented by Harris and Brannon, then, is whether a magistrate's
hearing accomplishes this purpose. The North Carolina court may have
been suggesting that it does." Proponents of review have concluded,
however, that unless courts review the credibility of allegations that led
to the issuance of a search warrant, "the warrant requirement embodied
in the fourth amendment [will be] open to circumvention by overzeal-
ous officials willing to make erroneous affidavits in the hope that the
33. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). See also Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925), in which the Court said:
In determining what is probable cause .... [w]e are concerned only with
the question of whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his
affidavit ... for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises
to be searched; and if the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that
a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was
a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issu-
ance of the warrant.
Id. at 441.
One commentator has suggested that the Court, by singling out the requirement
that the affiant had "reasonable grounds at the time of the affidavit" for his allegations,
settled the question dealt with here. The commentator notes, however, that courts have
not read Dumbra that way. Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits as a
Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REv. 825, 827 (1971).
34. One court expressed this idea by saying:
[I]t is now well established that a magistrate may not constitutionally issue
a search warrant until he is furnished with information sufficient to persuade
a reasonable man that probable cause for a search warrant exists. The purpose
of requiring this information is to give the magistrate the opportunity of know-
ing and weighing the facts and determining objectively for himself the need
for invading the privacy in order to enforce the law.
Commonwealth v. D'Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 337-38, 263 A.2d 441, 444 (1970) (citations
omitted).
The court said that when a magistrate rules on false information, he is precluded
from making the "detached and objective" determination contemplated by the Constitu-
tion. Id.
35. One court has stated, for example, that an affiant could be prosecuted for per-
jury. People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888
(1970). For a rebuttal to the effectiveness of this as a deterrent, see the dissent of
Justice Murphy in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949).
36. 367U.S.at656.
37. The court may have meant this when it said, 'The policy of the Fourth
Amendment to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures is adequately served
by" the magistrate's review. 25 N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
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resultant search or arrest will yield conclusive proof of criminal con-
duct."38
The pro-review courts appear to have a strong argument. The
Harris court said that it would permit a defendant to show that a
magistrate did not perform his job properly.3 9 That may respond to
arguments that magistrates often rubber-stamp warrant applications,
giving the affiant and his affidavit only a passing glance. 40  But it is
difficult to see how a magistrate who performs his job properly can
effectively judge credibility when he makes his decision in the context of
an ex parte proceeding. It is also difficult to picture circumstances in
which a magistrate would even doubt an affiant's testimony. The usual
affiant is a police officer, and a justifiable presumption would be that a
law enforcement officer giving sworn testimony is telling the truth."1
Further, in some cases, later evidence has demonstrated that a search
warrant has been issued on the basis of a false affidavit, despite a
magistrate's review."
Harris and other post-Mapp cases supporting the no-attack rule
have not refuted these arguments,4 3 nor have they provided other
grounds for defending the constitutionality of the no-attack rule.4 4 Some
courts4 5 have cited language in a 1967 Supreme Court case, McCray v.
38. United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 1973).
39. See note 14 supra.
40. Still, the defendant's brief in Harris indicated that the magistrate in that case
had not made more than cursory review of the affidavit:
[TThe magistrate first swore Officer Tripp to the affidavit after which he
swore Officer Tripp to the warrant and after reading the warrant and the affi-
davit and without any interrogation of the affiant, Tripp, and after reading the
affidavit, felt that the affidavit stated facts sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause for the search of the premises.
Brief for Appellant at 4, 25 N.C. App. 404, 213 S.E.2d 414.
41. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967), in which the Supreme Court
said that there is nothing in the due process clause requiring a judge to assume that every
police officer is committing perjury.
42. Brannon may be one example. After the first trial of the case, the trial judge
commented that the search warrant was probably invalid "because it seems to be based
on information contained in the affidavit that at least one of the state's witnesses swears
was not true." Record at 36,21 N.C. App. 464, 204 S.E.2d 895.
43. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2d 111, cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1024 (1966), where the court simply dismissed arguments that Mapp required reversal of
its position against attacks on credibility without any discussion of the reasons for its
decision.
44. Since Mapp, the objection to opening a trial to issues collateral to that of guilt
or innocence is clearly not sufficient. To comply with Mapp, courts must hold hearings
to determine whether evidence gained from searches without warrants should be admit-
ted.
45. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, -, 309 A.2d 135, 146 (1973);
People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 145, 258 N.E.2d 341, 344, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 888
(1970).
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Illinois,"6 in which the Court indicated approval of another court's
statement that the fourth amendment is served if a magistrate is trusted
to evaluate the credibility of an affiant in an ex parte hearing.4 7 But
the issue in McCray was not whether inquiry should be made into
the credibility of an affiant (in fact, extensive inquiry had been made),
and it is doubtful whether the Court meant to be addressing that point
at all.4" In fact, the United States Supreme Court has never ruled
directly on this issue.49
46. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
47. The Court was discussing the rule developed by some courts that in a hearing
to determine whether probable cause had existed for a search, a trial judge could
determine for himself whether police officers should be required to disclose an inform-
ant's identity. The Court said that "the reasoning of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
in judicially adopting the rule was instructive," then proceeded to quote at length from
the court's reasoning:
"The Fourth Amendment is served if a judicial mind passes upon the existence
of probable cause. Where the issue is submitted upon an application for a war-
rant, the magistrate is trusted to evaluate the credibility of the affiant in an
ex parte proceeding. As we have said, the magistrate is concerned, not with
whether the informant lied, but with whether the affiant is truthful in his reci-
tation of what he was told. If the magistrate doubts the credibility of the affi-
ant, he may require that the informant be identified or even produced. It
seems to us that the same approach is equally sufficient where the search was
without a warrant, that is to say, that it should rest entirely with the judge
who hears the motion to suppress to decide whether he needs such disclosure
as to the informant in order to decide whether the officer is a believable wit-
ness."
386 U.S. at 307-08, quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 385-88, 201 A.2d 39, 43-45
(1964).
48. McCray dealt with the validity of a search made pursuant to an arrest. In
order for the search to be lawful, the arrest had to be justified. Officers testified that
they made the arrest on the basis of information from an informant, but they refused to
give the name and address of that informant. The Court upheld a lower court's decision
to allow them to keep the identity of the informant secret, saying: "The arresting officers
in this case testified, in open court, fully and in precise detail as to what the informer
told them and as to why they had reason to believe his information was trustworthy.
Each officer was under oath. Each was subjected to searching cross-examination .
386 U.S. at 313.
Thus, inquiry had been made into the officers' credibility and the Court seemed
impressed that the officers had been cross-examined, something which does not occur at
an ex parte hearing.
49. The Court referred to the issue in 1964, but then did not decide it. Instead, the
Court assumed for the purposes of the case that such an attack may be made and went
on to conclude that even so, the search in that case had been valid. Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).
Several cases dealing with the issue have been appealed to the Supreme Court. In
fact, a North Carolina case on the issue, one decided in federal court, reached the
Supreme Court in 1974. North Carolina v. Wrenn, 417 U.S. 973 (1974). The Court
has refused to hear all of the appeals, however, although two justices, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice White, urged in Wrenn that it was time to resolve the question. Id. at
976.
In the end, the Court may uphold the no-attack rule by backing off from Mapp.
Some members of the Court have indicated displeasure with Mapp. See Justice Burger's
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and Justice
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If the Constitution does require something more than the no-attack
rule of Harris and Brannon, however, it might not require the other
extreme-that courts allow all defendants such as those in Harris the
right to question the affiant and, possibly, his informant, to probe for
evidence on the issue of credibility. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized the validity of a presumption in favor of an officer's
reliability50 and also has said that the decision of a magistrate should be
paid great respect.5 Thus, a court may be justified in requiring a
defendant to make an initial showing of a basis for questioning the
affiant's credibility before granting him a hearing.5 2  And the Court
said in McCray that judges may decide for themselves whether an
affiant should have the right to know the identity of, and thus question,
the affiant's informant.5"
In addition, all errors would not necessarily invalidate a search
warrant. The strongest case exists for suppression of intentional misre-
presentations. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has argued, the
"fullest deterrent sanctions of the exclusionary rule should be applied to
such serious and deliberate government wrongdoing . . . ," even to the
extent of invalidating a warrant for deliberate, non-material errors.54
Completely innocent misrepresentations would probably not be
sufficient, for the reasons given by the Seventh Circuit:
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter police
misconduct and good faith errors cannot be deterred. Further-
Harlan's dissent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court has
already evidenced this mood by holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence introduced before grand juries. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1973).
50. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967).
51. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
52. The Second Circuit has agreed with this:
The interposition of an "independent judicial officer, whose decision, not that
of the police, [will] govern whether liberty or privacy is to be invaded," . . .
goes a long way toward accomplishing the objectives of the Fourth Amend-
ment. True, the objectives are not accomplished if the judicial officer is put
upon by the police. But it is the responsibility of such officers . . . to see
to it that they are not deceived. The exclusionary rule, as applied in Fourth
Amendment cases, is a blunt instrument, conferring an altogether dispropor-
tionate reward not so much in the interests of the defendant as in that of soci-
ety at large. If a choice must be made between a rule requiring a hearing on
the truth of the affidavit in every case even though no ground for suspicion
has been suggested and another which takes care of the overwhelming bulk of
the cases, the policies of the Fourth Amendment will be adequately served by
the latter even though a rare false affidavit may occasionally slip by.
United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002
(1970).
53. 386 U.S. at 313.
54. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1972).
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more, such errors do not negate probable cause. If an agent rea-
sonably believes facts which on their face indicate that a crime has
probably 'been committed, then even if mistaken, he has probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed.y5
Negligent and reckless misrepresentations might be deterable.50
Even so, several courts have argued that if the misrepresentation is
immaterial, it did not affect the issuance of the search warrant and
consequently, there is no justification for suppressing the evidence. 5
There is Supreme Court authority in support of this position."'
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a procedure that implements the
above reasoning. That court has held that to be entitled to a hearing on
the credibility of a search warrant or affidavit, a defendant must make a
showing of an error that was either committed with an intent to deceive
the magistrate, whether or not material to the showing of probable
cause, or made non-intentionally but was material to the establishment
of probable cause. "9 The Seventh Circuit has not precisely defined the
nature of the "showing" required, but clearly the defendant must
produce something that at least raises a doubt in the judge's mind. Once
a hearing is granted, a defendant will be granted his motion to suppress
if the trial court finds that the government agent was intentionally
untruthful about an allegation or recklessly untruthful about material
issues."
55. Id. at 988-89.
One court has indicated, though, that it would apply the exclusionary rule to
innocent, material errors. In United States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1973), the
Fifth Circuit said:
The warrant procedure operates on the assumption that statements in the affi-
davit presented to the issuing magistrate are at least an accurate representation
of what the affiant knows though possibly inadequate to show probable cause.
It would quickly deteriorate into a meaningless formality were we to approve
searches and seizures based on misrepresentative or incorrect factual state-
ments. Thus, when an affidavit contains inaccurate statements which mate-
rially affect its showing of probable cause, any warrant based upon it is
rendered invalid.
Id. at 662.
56. The Seventh Circuit has argued, however, that it would be too difficult to
ascertain whether an error had been negligently or innocently made. Thus, the court
concluded that a motion to suppress should be granted only upon a finding of at least
reckless conduct. United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979, 989 (7th Cir. 1972).
57. See United States v. Carmichael, 489 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); State v.
Hink, 6 Wash. App. 374,492 P.2d 1053 (1972).
58. In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1974), discussed in note 49
supra, the Supreme Court upheld the search warrant on the grounds that any errors were
not material to the finding of probable cause.
59. 489 F.2d at 988.
60. Id.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals indicated in Harris and
Brannon that a concern for opening a trial to issues "collateral to that of
guilt or innocence" of a defendant led it to adopt the rule against attacks
on credibility. 61 If that was its concern, the court should consider a
procedure such as the one followed in the Seventh Circuit, instead of
adopting the absolute rule against attacks on credibility. In most cases,
the court would accomplish its objective of avoiding a hearing on
collateral issues. Few defendants would pass the initial showing obsta-
cle, particularly in cases in which the court found no cause for requiring
police officers to disclose the identity of their informants. -02  Meanwhile,
the court would be following a procedure more in line with the constitu-
tional policies put forth by Mapp by granting review of credibility in the
most flagrant situations.
NANCY BENTSON ESSEX
Securities Regulation-Vicarious Liability For Securities Acts Vi-
olations-By Common Law or By Statute?
Congress regulated a variety of activities relating to the distribution
and trading of securities in the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. -  Each of these acts contains a provision
whereby one in "control"' of an individual who violates the acts' provi-
sions may also be held liable for the violation.4 This liability, however,
61. The court indicated this when it said: "To permit a defendant to challenge the
truth or accuracy of the factual averments of the affidavit, would open at trial an issue or
issues, theretofore judicially determined, collateral to that of guilt or innocence." 25
N.C. App. at 406, 213 S.E.2d at 416.
62. One court has argued that the initial showing requirement would not cut down
on the number of pretrial hearings. State v. Anonymous, 30 Conn. Supp. 211, -, 309
A.2d 135, 146 (1973). As long as the court required something more than mere
allegations to constitute a "showing," however, it would seem the threshold obstacle
would be a barrier to some and probably to most defendants.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
2. Id. §§ 78a-hh.
3. "Control" is an intentionally undefined term. The framers of the Securities
Exchange Act commented on its meaning: "It was thought undesirable to attempt to
define the term. It would be difficult if not impossible to enumerate or to anticipate the
many ways in which actual control may be exerted. A few examples of the methods
used are stock ownership, lease, contract and agency." H.R. RaP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 26 (1934).
4. Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
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is made subject to the defense that the controlling person was ignorant
of the violation or acted in "good faith."5  The federal judiciary has
occasionally faced the question whether the controlling persons provi-
sions afford the exclusive means of imputing liability for violations of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts to the violator's superiors, or whether vicarious
liability can also be predicated upon common-law principles of respon-
deat superior' or agency.7 Since common-law liability attaches regard-
less of the personal culpability of the master or principal, the issue is of
considerable practical importance. A distinct split has emerged from
those circuits in which the matter has been considered. In Zweig v.
Hearst Corp." the Ninth Circuit for the first time clearly held that
common-law principles of vicarious liability have no application to ac-
tions brought under the 1934 Act.9 As a consequence defendant Hearst
Corporation was afforded an opportunity to exculpate itself by proving
that it had "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation."1
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding
with one or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title,
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to be-
lieve in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless
the controlling person acted in good faith, and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
5. See final clauses of sections quoted in note 4 supra.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 250-67 (1954).
7. See id. §§ 219-49. While vicarious liability based on a master-servant relation-
ship is distinct, both in terms of origin and effect, from that based on a principal-agent
relationship, both will be referred to in terms of "agency." See Ferson, Bases for
Master's Liability and For Principal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REv. 260
(1951).
8. 521 F.2d 1129 (9thCir. 1975).
9. The opinion in Zweig states that Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), provides controlling
authority for the decision. The Kamen opinion is rather cryptic, however, and its
ambiguity has been noted by both court and commentator. Jackson v. Bache & Co., 381
F. Supp. 71, 94 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Note, Vicarious Liability For Securities Law
Violations: Respondeat Superior and the Controlling Person Sections, 15 WM. & MAY
L. REv. 713,716 (1974).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970). See note 4 supra.
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Zweig v. Hearst Corp. resulted from the publication of a financial
column by defendant Hearst Corporation (hereinafter Hearst). This
column, authored by a longtime and apparently reliable employee of the
paper, praised the virtues of a publicly-held corporation. Undis-
closed was the fact that the columnist held some of the corporation's
stock. Subsequent to the publication of this laudatory column, the price
of the corporation's stock advanced dramatically. The financial writer
disposed of some or all of his stock at this higher price. The value of
the stock later declined. Suit was brought against both the columnist
and Hearst by a number of persons who alleged financial injury as a
consequence of the price fluctuation of the corporation's stock allegedly
resulting from the newspaper story. Plaintiffs contended that the wri-
ter's failure to disclose his interest in the company constituted a violation
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act11 and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.1 2 Vicarious liability was
asserted against Hearst based upon the employment relationship. Hearst
moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plain-
tiffs appealed, arguing that Hearst should be held liable for the acts of
its employee under an "agency theory of respondeat superior." The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention, relying on its
previous holding in Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.13 which
it characterized as follows:
Kamen appears to be the forerunner of a series of cases in
the various circuits treating with the liability of an employer where
an employee violates Section 10(b). It was there held that Section
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
12. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, promulgated under authority
of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
courts have recognized a private right of action for rule 10b-5 violations which result in
investor injury. Recognition of such a right is now virtually universal, and has received
the tacit endorsement of the Supreme Court. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). See 6 L. Loss, SECURITIs REGULATION 3870-73
(1969).
13. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
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20(a), the controlling person provision, is to be applied to deter-
mine such liability. The contention that the more stringent doc-
trine of respondeat superior remained effective to establish vicari-
ous liability was rejected.14
While the Ninth Circuit in Kamen and Zweig did not address
arguments that the statutory provision preempts the common law theo-
ries of liability, the issue has been the subject of judicial disagreement in
recent years. At least three circuits have concluded that vicarious
liability for violations of the Securities Acts can be predicated on com-
mon law principles. Of these, the Fifth Circuit adopted sub silentio a
non-exclusivity position, holding a brokerage firm liable for an employ-
ee's sale of unregistered securities on the basis of principles embodied in
the Restatement of Agency.15 The Seventh Circuit, in Fey v. Walston &
Co., Inc.,' similarly rejected arguments that the controlling persons
provision of the 1934 Act is exclusive, citing precedent that purportedly
recognized "that the mere existence of remedial provisions in the Securi-
ties Acts does not foreclose -the application of similar common law
remedies . . . . 17 The Fourth Circuit's stance, enunciated in Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton,' hinges the non-exlusivity of the control-
ling persons sections on congressional intent and public policy. The
SEC has argued in favor of non-exclusivity for similar reasons.' 9
Cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits have reached contrary
results. In SEC v. Lum's, Inc. 0 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York determined that the controlling persons section of
the 1934 Act afforded the sole means of imputing an employee's rule
IOb-5 violation of his employer,"' relying partly on the Second Circuit's
decision in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.2" It was determined in the latter case
that the controlling persons provision provided the standard by which
the vicarious liability of corporate directors was to be determined.
14. 521 F.2d at 1132.
15. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
16. 493 F.2d 1036 (7thCir. 1974).
17. Id. at 1052n.18.
18. 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970). The district court's position on the exclusivity issue was
adopted by the Fourth Circuit, however. See 422 F.2d at 1130.
19. Brief for SEC as amicus curiae at 13-14, 23, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen
& Co., 390 U.S. 942 (1968), cited in, Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par! Delicto, Indemnification, and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597, at 606 n.37, 607 n.41 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SEC Brief].
20. 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
21. See note 12 supra.
22. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Likewise, the Ninth Circuit's Kamen decision, recently clarified in
Zweig, now stands for the proposition that the controlling persons
section of the 1934 Act affords the exclusive basis for imputing liability
for rule 1 Ob-5 violations to the violator's employer.23
The facts in the Lanza and Zweig decisions are distinctive from
those in other cases because neither involved the typical situation:
vicarious liability asserted against a brokerage house for the Securities
Acts violations of its employees. While such factual differences may
contribute to the split in the circuits regarding the exclusivity question,
an explicit and controlling basis of disagreement has been a differing
perception of Congress's intent in enacting the controlling persons
sections. In Hopkins the district court concluded: "What legislative
history there is does not indicate that Congress intended Section 15 [of
the 1933 Act], originally or as amended, to serve as a limitation on
liability,"2 4 while the Second Circuit, analyzing the -history of the equiv-
alent section of the 1934 Act, observed that:
[t]he intent of Congress in adding this section, passed at the same
time as the amendment to Section 15 of the 1933 Act, was obvi-
ously to impose liability only on those directors ...who are in
some meaningful sense culpable participants in the fraud perpe-
trated by controlled persons.2 5
Attempts to discern Congress's intent in enacting the controlling
persons provisions seem unlikely to result in a definitive resolution
of the exclusivity issue. No evidence that Securities Acts draftsmen
considered the exclusivity question per se has come to light, and such a
failure of congressional foresight seems quite plausible if one accepts
Professor Ruder's arguments that Congress similarly failed to consider
whether the Acts contained an implied private right of action for
violations.20 The history of the control sections themselves affords no
clear insight into the purposes of Congress. Legislative reports indicate
that the control provision of the 1933 Act was enacted to thwart
23. 382 F.2d at 697. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
24. 297 F. Supp. at 1211.
25. 479 F.2d at 1299.
26. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963). Professor Ruder's argument, if correct, supports
the conclusion that Congress did not foresee the exclusivity question in two ways: it
comments on the general inability of the Securities Acts draftsmen to foresee the
reception their legislation would receive from the courts; it suggests that private actions
under the Acts were contemplated 'as purely statutory creatures, the common law
regarding vicarious liability having no more relevance thereto than would common law
defining an appropriate period of limitation. See also note 12 supra.
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securities violations by individuals operating through "dummies," 7 and
it may consequently be inferred that the controlling persons sections
were intended to only govern vicarious liability outside the usual em-
ployment situation .2  Yet, legislative reports also indicate that "agency"
was one relationship that "control" was meant to embrace, 9 thereby
giving rise to the inference that the control sections were intended to
govern situations in which an employee acts as an employer's agent.
Furthermore, because the Acts were frankly-recognized compro-
mises between the interests of the investing public and those of the
business community,3 any examination of congressional purpose be-
hind their enactment is likely to be similarly unenlightening. Refer-
ences to the goals of the legislators in passing the Acts can therefore be
used as a basis for arguing either side of the exclusivity question,
depending on which aspects of legislative history a particular court
chooses to emphasize. True effectuation of the purposes of the Securi-
ties Acts might better be attained through a balancing of interests of the
sort suggested by the history and structure of the Acts themselves.
Brokerage houses seem most commonly to be the parties against
whom vicarious liability is asserted in actions in which the exclusivity
issue has been raised. Brokerage firms are subject to the rules of the
SEC,' the various exchanges3 2 and NASD." Failure to comply with
27. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
28. Such was the position of the SEC in its brief. SEC Brief, supra note 19, at 14.
See Note, 15 WM. & MARY L. Rnv., supra note 9, at 721-22.
29. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). The control section of
the 1934 Act was apparently patterned after section 15 of the 1933 Act, and it may
consequently be inferred that congressional purposes were similar. See Note, 15 WM. &
NIARY L. REV., supra note 9, at 721.
30. In a March, 1933 message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated: "The
purpose of the legislation I seek is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1933), H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). These dual purposes were also expressly
recognized by members of Congress. See Ruder, supra note 26, at 648 & n.112. The
balance between specifically permitted private actions, and the limitations which accom-
pany each, further evidences that the Acts are compromises between opposing interests.
See id. at 649-50.
31. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.01-287.101 (1974).
32. Section 5 of the 1934 Act prohibits transactions on exchanges that are neither
registered with the SEC nor exempted by the Commission from such registration.
Registration involves the submission of exchange rules to the SEC. These rules must be
"just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors ...." (15 U.S.C. §
78f(d) (1970)), and must include provisions for disciplining a member for "conduct
or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade .... " Id. §
78f(b).
33. Rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers regulate transactions in
over-the-counter markets. 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970).
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these rules has been found to preclude the "good faith" defense,84 and
could serve as the basis of an independent suit.8 5 Such firms, already
required by regulation to supervise thoroughly36 and hire carefully,81
seem already forced to do all in their power to prevent employees'
securities law violations. It is difficult to conceive of any further
precautions that might be taken as a consequence of the imposition of
strict liability for employees' misdeeds. Thus, with respect to this group
of litigants, absolute liability for employees' securities law violations
seems unlikely to serve any additional deterrence function.
While liability based on agency principles would not serve any
further deterrence purposes with respect to securities dealers, such a
liability standard would serve to guarantee to victims compensation for
their financial loss. Compensation was apparently a goal of the Securi-
,ties Acts.38 In cases in which a brokerage house so demonstrated the
adequacy of its supervision and care that a jury determined that the
brokerage firm acted in "good faith," compensation might be denied the
injured investor. In the Hopkins decision the district court stated:
If Hutton, as the defendant in this case, is not liable . . . for the
activities of . . .the manager of its oil and gas department, ...
then the partners in Hutton and in other brokerage houses like it
can seemingly escape all liability under 12(2) by the simple ex-
pedient of making certain "not to know or have reasonable grounds
34. Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42
(10th Cir. 1971); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v.
Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970).
35. See Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability To Its Customer For Violation
of a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 253 (1970); Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based on Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLuM. L. RaV. 12 (1966);
Lowenfels, Private Enforcement In The Over-the-Counter Markets: Implied Liabilities
Based On NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L. REv. 633 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability
For Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENY. L.J. 63 (1970); Note, Federal
Margin Requirements as a Basis For Civil Liability, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 1462 (1966);
Note, Private Actions as a Remedy For Violations of Stock Exchange Rules, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 825 (1970).
36. See e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 342, American Stock Exchange Rule
320.
37. See e.g., New York Stock Exchange Rule 345, American Stock Exchange Rule
340 and comment .02 thereto.
38. Investor protection is a well-recognized purpose of the Acts. See, e.g., Baird v.
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.) (Clark, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 737 (1944), wherein Judge Clark pointed out thirty-six places where the 1934
Act refers to the goal of investor protection. That such protection entailed a right of
compensation for injury has served as a basis for the implication of a private right of
action under rule lob-5. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the lia-
bility . . is alleged to exist." Such a construction of Section 12
(2) and 15 would in effect mean that the partners in a brokerage
house who kept their eyes and ears closed to the fraudulent conduct
of one of their registered representatives, could reap the harvest of
that employee's conduct with impunity. Such a result would leave
investors with much shallower protection than was intended by
Congress in its passage of the '33 Act and the 1934 amendment
to Section 15.30
While it is doubtful that brokerage firms could behave with such
impunity, given the breadth of rule 10b-5 and prevailing interpretation
of the good faith defense,4" any protection of the firm's deeper pocket
when its customers are injured by employees' misdeeds requires justifi-
cation. Such justification might be found in the argument that the
customer looks to a brokerage firm not as guarantor of its employees'
honesty and capability, but as an organization that does all in its power
to assure such honesty and capability through careful employee selection
and supervision. When the firm fails to discharge these duties the
customer's recovery should be against the firm. Careful selection and
supervision is arguably all that the customer should expect of the firm,
however, and when an employee nonetheless wrongfully injures an
investor it is only to the employee that the customer should look for
recovery.
This argument does not seem compelling when it is remembered
that the firm profits from all business that its employees generate.4' But
decisions that seek to avoid such seeming inequity by hinging vicarious
liability for securities laws violations on agency theories will require the
application of agency principles in situations other than those involving
a broker-client relationship-situations in which vicarious liability seems
less appropriate. The potential liability that might attach to a general
circulation newspaper because of its financial columnist's actions and
recommendations is out of all proportion to the profits such a column
could generate. Further, it seems clear that a newspaper is in a much
poorer position to warrant the propriety of an employee's financial
dealings and advice than is a brokerage house comprised of securities
39. 297 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
40. See, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Lun's Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1046, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Moerman v. Zipco, 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y.
1969).
41. Brokerage firms earn commissions which are roughly proportional to the
volume of trading undertaken on behalf of their customers,
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professionals. A financial columnist is a writer, not a broker or advisor.
His advice no more carries the newspaper's warrant than does that of
Ann Landers. It is the financial columnist himself, not the newspaper,
to whom readers should look for responsibility for the propriety of
analyses and recommendations. It therefore would be unfortunate if
agency principles, under which the newspaper would be held vicariously
liable as a consequence of the columnist's employment, should govern
such a situation.
Virtual strict liability may be imposed on brokerage firms by
reading the good faith defense to require extremely high supervisory
standards over brokerage employees. But wholesale application of
agency principles of vicarious liability to securities law violations would
render the good faith defense a near nullity and remove from courts the
ability to deny liability in circumstances such as those in the Zweig
case. With the growth of securities litigation it seems likely that vicar-
ious liability may be asserted against business enterprises that have an
even less direct relationship with the securities field than that of the
Hearst Corporation. Courts should continue to balance the interests
embodied in the Securities Acts, and should permit employers to avail
themselves of the exculpatory clauses of the Acts' controlling persons
provisions.
JAMES JEROME HARTZELL
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